Proposed Rules to Determine the Legal Use of Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Platforms in Domestic U.S. Law Enforcement by Sinclair, Michael
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF
LAW & TECHNOLOGY
Volume 20 | Issue 1 Article 1
10-1-2018
Proposed Rules to Determine the Legal Use of
Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Platforms in
Domestic U.S. Law Enforcement
Michael Sinclair
United States Coast Guard
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt
Part of the Law Enforcement and Corrections Commons, National Security Law Commons, and
the Science and Technology Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in North Carolina
Journal of Law & Technology by an authorized editor of Carolina Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
law_repository@unc.edu.
Recommended Citation
Michael Sinclair, Proposed Rules to Determine the Legal Use of Autonomous and Semi-Autonomous Platforms in Domestic U.S. Law
Enforcement, 20 N.C. J.L. & Tech. 1 (2018).
Available at: https://scholarship.law.unc.edu/ncjolt/vol20/iss1/1
NORTH CAROLINA JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY 
VOLUME 20, ISSUE 1: OCTOBER 2018 
1 
PROPOSED RULES TO DETERMINE THE LEGAL USE OF 
AUTONOMOUS AND SEMI-AUTONOMOUS PLATFORMS IN 
DOMESTIC U.S. LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Michael Sinclair 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
On July 7, 2016, the Dallas Police Department affixed a pound 
of C4 plastic explosive to a remotely-controlled bomb disposal robot 
and rolled it into a parking garage that held a barricaded gunman, 
Micah X. Johnson.2 A little over two hours earlier, Johnson engaged 
the Dallas police in a 45-minute gun battle in which he killed five 
                                                
 2 See Manny Fernandez, Richard Pérez-Peña & Jonah Engel Bromwich, Five 
Dallas Officers Were Killed as Payback, Police Chief Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/09/us/dallas-police-shooting.html 
(describing the events of the shootings). 
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officers and wounded nine others, including two civilians.3 Shortly 
after the robot entered the garage, the Dallas Police detonated the 
C4, killing Johnson. In doing so, the Dallas police ushered in a new 
age in police use of lethal force in American law enforcement.4 
Over the last decade, the United States has increasingly used 
drones in its “war on terror.”5 Media, legal and academic scholars, 
and novelists have extensively analyzed the use of these devices in 
this context, which has made the drone the quintessential symbol of 
21st century warfare.6 
However, less has been written about American domestic law 
enforcement’s use of similar technology.7 Yet a brief survey of 
                                                
 3 Id. 
 4 See generally Melissa Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force, 111 NW. U. L. REV. 
155 (2017) [hereinafter Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force] (providing legal 
analysis on the use of police force in the Dallas shooting). 
 5 See generally WILLIAM M. ARKIN, UNMANNED: DRONES, DATA, AND THE 
ILLUSION OF PERFECT WARFARE 147–75 (Little, Brown and Co., 1st ed. 2015) 
(providing an overview of U.S. drone use in the “war” against terror); AVERY 
PLAW, MATTHEW S. FRICKER & CARLOS R. COLON, THE DRONE DEBATE: A 
PRIMER ON THE U.S. USE OF UNMANNED AIRCRAFT OUTSIDE CONVENTIONAL 
BATTLEFIELDS 13-63 (2016); P.W. SINGER, WIRED FOR WAR: THE ROBOTICS 
REVOLUTION AND CONFLICT IN THE 21ST CENTURY, 19–41 (1st ed. 2009); Laurie 
R. Blank, After “Top Gun”: How Drone Strikes Impact the Law of War, 33 U. 
PA. J. INT’L L. 675 (2012); Henry H. Perritt, Jr. & Eliot O. Sprague, Drones, 17 
VAND. J. ENT. & TECH. L. 673 (2015). 
 6 See supra note 5. 
 7 That is not to say that it has not been written about. See generally Alexandra 
A. Breshears, Use of Armed Drones by Domestic Law Enforcement: Presence and 
the Fourth Reasonableness Factor, 33 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 183 (2016); Eric 
Brumfield, Armed Drones for Law Enforcement: Why It Might Be Time to Re-
Examine the Current Use of Force Standard, 46 MCGEORGE L. REV. 543 (2014); 
Hamilton, Excessive Lethal Force, supra note 4; Melissa Hamilton, Police Robots 
and the Law, 31 NO. 1 WESTLAW JOURNAL WHITE-COLLAR CRIME 1, 4 (2016) 
[hereinafter Hamilton, Police Robots and the Law]; Chris Jenks, State Labs of 
Federalism and Law Enforcement “Drone” Use, 72 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1389 
(2015); Elizabeth E. Joh, Policing Police Robots, 64 UCLA L. REV. DISCOURSE 
516 (2016); Gregory S. McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, 
84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 354 (2016) [hereinafter McNeal, Drones and the Future 
of Aerial Surveillance]; Melanie Reid, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment in the 
Age of Supercomputers, Artificial Intelligence, and Robots, 119 W. VA. L. REV. 
863 (2017). 
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media reports and internet searches using the term “[insert 
municipality police department] drone use” reveals that many U.S. 
law enforcement agencies incorporate or are considering 
incorporating semi-autonomous “drones” or “robots” into their daily 
operations.8 As of April 2017, the Center for the Study of the Drone 
at Bard College in New York noted that “at least 347 state and local 
                                                
 8 See Jonathan Bullington, New Orleans Police Considering Drones, Transit 
Hub Changes, in Wake of Weekend Violence, NOLA.COM (Dec. 1, 2015, 6:34 PM), 
http://www.nola.com/crime/index.ssf/2015/12/new_orleans_police_drones_buse
.html (describing that the New Orleans Police Department is “testing the use of 
drones to aid in crime-scene investigations”); Benny Evangelista, Fire, Police 
Drones Caught Between Saving Lives, Guarding Rights, S.F. CHRON. (May 11, 
2017, 6:00 AM), http://www.sfchronicle.com/business/article/Fire-police-
drones-caught-between-saving-lives-11137289.php (reporting on public safety 
including police use of drones in the San Francisco Bay area); Jerry Iannelli, 
Miami Beach Police Department Buys Two Drones for $17,000, MIAMI NEW 
TIMES (Mar. 27, 2017, 8:00 AM), http://www.miaminewtimes.com/news/miami-
beach-police-department-buys-two-drones-for-17000-9228675 (reporting on the 
Miami Beach Police Department’s recent purchase of two drones, in addition to 
the “military-grade” one it already had purchased in 2010); Kate Mather, LAPD 
Becomes Nation’s Largest Police Department to Test Drones after Oversight 
Panel Signs off on Controversial Program, L.A. TIMES (Oct. 17, 2017, 9:05 PM), 
http://beta.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapd-drones-20171017-story.html 
(reporting on the LAPD’s decision to field a police drone no later than December 
2017); Tina Moore, NYPD Considering Using Drones and Gunshot Detectors to 
Fight Crime, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (May 20, 2014, 11:54 PM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/nyc-crime/nypd-drones-fight-crime-
article-1.1799980 (reporting on the NYPD’s consideration of employing drones); 
Jan Ransom, Privacy Advocates Take Issue with Police Drone Use, BOSTON 
GLOBE (Sep. 25, 2017), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2017/09/25/boston-
police-purchasing-drones/SAiDlIMlJT4DHaDkBMjHML/story.html (reporting 
on the Boston Police Department’s recent purchase of drones); Leif Reigstad, It’s 
Official: HPD is Looking Into Using Drones, HOUSTONPRESS.COM (Mar. 11, 
2016, 6:00 AM), https://www.houstonpress.com/news/its-official-hpd-is-
looking-into-using-drones-8232801 (reporting on the Houston Police 
Department’s research into using drones for law enforcement); Lisa Roose-
Church, Michigan State Police Shows How It Will Use Drone, DET. FREE PRESS 
(Mar. 12, 2015, 2:22 PM), http://www.freep.com/story/ 
news/local/michigan/2015/03/12/michigan-state-police-drone/70214866/ 
(reporting on the Michigan State Police’s press demonstration on how it intends 
to use an Unmanned Aircraft System, an Aeryon SkyRanger, for police work in 
Michigan). 
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police, sheriff, fire, and emergency units [in the United States] have 
acquired drones . . . .”9 
The use of drone technology in the domestic law enforcement 
context brings with it legal issues and challenges equally as complex 
as the military’s use of drones.10 I argue that the domestic use of 
drones in the law enforcement context brings significantly more 
complex legal issues than the use of expeditionary defense drones 
because of the enhanced Constitutional protections people in the 
United States enjoy.11 
The trend towards American police militarization,12 alongside 
the increasing autonomy13 of unmanned systems complicate this 
issue. Yet it is foreseeable that American domestic law enforcement 
                                                
 9 Dan Gettinger, Public Safety Drones, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE 
(Apr. 2017), http://dronecenter.bard.edu/public-safety-drones/. 
 10 See RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42701, DRONES 
IN DOMESTIC SURVEILLANCE OPERATIONS: FOURTH AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS 
AND LEGISLATIVE RESPONSES (2013), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42701.pdf; 
Brumfield, supra note 7, at 556–65 (analyzing the Fourth Amendment (seizure) 
and its application in law enforcement’s use of drones); Jenks, supra note 7, at 
1403–24 (analyzing the application of the Fourth Amendment to law enforcement 
drone use); Gregory McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for 
Legislatures, BROOKINGS (Nov. 2014), https://www.brookings.edu/ 
research/drones-and-aerial-surveillance-considerations-for-legislatures/ 
[hereinafter McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: Considerations for 
Legislatures] (discussing the Fourth Amendment (search) legal implications of 
law enforcement drone use); Reid, supra note 7, at 872–74, 887 (discussing the 
Fourth Amendment’s application to robotic policing). 
 11 See supra note 10. 
 12 See RADLEY BALKO, RISE OF THE WARRIOR COP: THE MILITARIZATION OF 
AMERICA’S POLICE FORCES (2013); Dan Gettinger & Arthur Holland Michel, Law 
Enforcement Robots Data Sheet, CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF THE DRONE (2016) 
http://dronecenter.bard.edu/law-enforcement-robots-datasheet/ (noting “[t]he rate 
of transfers [of drones] to law enforcement agencies has increased from less than 
10 transfers each year prior to 2010 to over 200 transfers so far in 2016”); Mark 
Nevitt, Why Are We Giving U.S. Police Departments Bayonets?, JUST SECURITY 
(Aug. 31, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/44588/giving-u-s-police-
departments-bayonets/. 
 13 See Capt. Brent D. Sadler, USN, AI Goes to War!, 142 U.S. NAVAL INST. 
PROC., Dec. 2016, at 43–47.  
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will continue to increase its use of semi- and inevitably14 fully 
autonomous devices to execute its mission of public safety and 
security. This increased use generally—and with specific regard to 
more autonomous systems driven by advancements in artificial 
intelligence (“AI”)15—brings with it significant risks without the 
development of widely accepted best practices or guidelines that 
would optimally help illuminate where, when, and how civilian law 
enforcement agencies can best employ these tools while addressing 
the risks to individual rights under the law. 
Legal scholars have concluded that existing Fourth Amendment 
case law likely provides sufficient protections with regard to 
American domestic law enforcement’s use of unmanned aerial 
systems (UAS) for what could fairly be characterized as “search” 
activities, with but minor adjustments to account for (1) true 
exigencies and (2) eventually fully autonomous UAS’ potential 
greater on-scene time, as compared to manned aviation systems.16 I 
concur with that analysis and will not travel too far down that 
relatively well-trod ground in this paper. 
With regard to the use of force by police robots, I believe that a 
scheme which generally creates an inverse relationship between 
autonomy and lethality, with a special focus on rapidly developing 
non-lethal-use-of-force technology,17 could provide a strong 
                                                
 14 See, e.g., SINGER, supra note 5, at 123–24 (describing the increasing 
capabilities of autonomous robots). 
 15 Scott Rosenberg, Why AI is Still Waiting for Its Ethics Transplant, WIRED 
(Nov. 1, 2017, 6:45 AM), https://www.wired.com/story/why-ai-is-still-waiting-
for-its-ethics-transplant/ (interviewing Kate Crawford, co-founder of the AI Now 
Institute and discussing Ms. Crawford’s perception that current standards of AI 
ethics are wanting). 
 16 See Jenks, supra note 7; see also McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance: 
Considerations for Legislatures, supra note 10, at 4. 
 17 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 83 (“Many believe that if a robot is going to 
have a weapon, it should be a nonlethal one.”). But see RONALD C. ARKIN, 
GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR IN AUTONOMOUS ROBOTS 71 (Chapman & Hall 
2009) [hereinafter ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR] (“The application of 
nonlethal weaponry—for example, Tasers, sting-nets, foaming agents . . . can also 
potentially lead to unintentional lethality. They are sometimes referred to as less-
lethal weapons, rather than nonlethal, for that reason.”). See generally NON-
LETHAL WEAPONS PROGRAM, DEP’T OF DEF., http://jnlwp.defense.gov (last 
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foundation for an analytical paradigm which would successfully 
balance the capabilities that semi- and fully autonomous devices 
provide law enforcement with the importance of protecting 
important fundamental individual rights. Further, I believe that 
applying a strict civil liability standard for lethal use of force errors 
committed by autonomous law enforcement devices may help 
mitigate public concerns regarding appropriate accountability for 
their use.18 
This article focuses on the seizure or arrest aspect of domestic 
law enforcement. Most of the analysis center on how domestic law 
enforcement agencies can optimally leverage the many benefits of 
semi-autonomous and fully autonomous devices to better execute 
their mission of public safety and security while managing the risks 
when these devices inevitably employ force up to and including 
deadly force. 
Part I provides a general overview of the U.S. military’s history 
in employing unmanned systems in the “war on terror.” Part II 
frames the terms “robot” and “autonomy,” and sketches out the pros 
and cons of law enforcement’s use of robots later in the paper. It 
starts by focusing on issues involving law enforcement patrols, 
continues by defining and distinguishing between joint and 
independent patrols, characterizes three different modes of 
employing robots—remotely, semi-autonomously, and fully 
autonomously—and concludes by establishing the difference 
between tactical police patrols and operational-level patrols. Part III 
surveys the existing legal and policy landscape currently applicable 
when analyzing U.S. law enforcement’s use of remotely-operated, 
semi-autonomous, and more fully autonomous devices. It starts with 
                                                
visited Nov. 24, 2017) (providing a homepage for the Department of Defense’s 
joint non-lethal weapons program). 
 18 See GABRIEL HALLEVY, WHEN ROBOTS KILL: ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE 
UNDER CRIMINAL LAW 104–19 (Northeastern Univ. Press 2013); ALEX 
CAMPOLO, MADELYN SANFILIPPO, MEREDITH WHITTAKER & KATE CRAWFORD, 
AI NOW 2017 REPORT (2017), https://assets. 
contentful.com/8wprhhvnpfc0/1A9c3ZTCZa2KEYM64Wsc2a/8636557c5fb14f
2b74b2be64c3ce0c78/_AI_Now_Institute_2017_Report_.pdf (calling for strong 
oversight and accountability mechanisms in fielding AI for a wide range of civil 
purposes). 
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a discussion of constitutional standards of search and seizure, and, 
with specific regard to the use of force, discusses how and to what 
extent U.S. law marries up to international human rights law on the 
subject, while also providing an overview of available domestic 
policy guidance on law enforcement use of “drones.” Part IV 
analyzes the pros and cons of law enforcement use of remotely-
operated, semi-autonomous and more fully autonomous devices. 
Part V includes my recommendations using the framework in Part 
II and law and policy in Part III to address the issues identified and 
described in Part IV. 
II.  THE U.S. MILITARY’S USE OF REMOTELY-OPERATED 
WEAPONS IN THE “WAR ON TERROR.” 
Al Qaeda’s terror attacks against America on September 11, 
2001,19 ushered in an era of deployed U.S. military forces that 
continues on through today and will likely proceed into the 
foreseeable future with American armed forces conducting 
operations and fighting in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, Somalia, Libya, 
Yemen,20 and throughout the African continent.21 There have been 
many military developments during this extended fight, but none are 
as emblematic as America’s use of what may be labeled as 
                                                
 19 See THE 9/11 COMMISSION REP., NAT’L COMMISSION ON TERRORIST 
ATTACKS UPON THE U.S. (2004) [hereinafter 9/11 Comm’n], 
https://govinfo.library.unt.edu/911/report/911Report.pdf. 
 20 See THE WHITE HOUSE, REPORT ON THE LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORKS 
GUIDING THE UNITED STATES’ USE OF MILITARY FORCE AND RELATED NATIONAL 
SECURITY OPERATIONS 6–10 (2016) (providing the domestic and international 
legal support for continued U.S. military operations in certain locations overseas). 
 21 See Dionne Searcey & Eric Schmitt, In Niger, Where U.S. Troops Died, a 
Lawless and Shifting Landscape, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/29/world/africa/niger-ambush-isis.html 
(reporting on a battle involving U.S. special forces that resulted in the deaths of 
four U.S. Army members and noting that there were 800 U.S. service members in 
Niger and approximately 6,000 spread throughout the African continent). 
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automated warfighting systems (AWS) and specifically armed UAS, 
more commonly referred to as “drones.”22 
There are many reasons why America became “wired” in its war 
against terror, and, looking back, it is relatively easy to see how this 
occurred.23 AWS—and especially UAS—are the rare force 
multiplier in that they help battlefield commanders stake out and 
maintain the literal high ground.24 Specifically, they increase 
capacity and capabilities in areas critical to warfighting such as 
battlefield awareness, surveillance, and reconnaissance.25 
Non-human war machines are superior to humans in many 
respects. They are inexpensive compared to both their manned 
counterparts and individual human soldiers in that they do not need 
to be trained, fed, housed, or paid.26 Further, they are not limited by 
physical, psychological, or other constraints27 in that “[t]hey don’t 
                                                
 22 See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 5; PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 13; 
SINGER, supra note 5, at 19–41; Blank, supra note 5, at 675; Perritt Jr. & Sprague, 
supra note 5. 
 23 See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 18; SINGER, supra note 5, at 215-24; Luke 
Dormehl, How Did We Get Here? 9 Major Milestones in the History of Killer 
Robots, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 21, 2017, 3:00 AM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/history-of-killer-robots/. 
 24 See Drones: What Are They and How Do They Work?, BBC NEWS (Jan. 31, 
2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-10713898 (“[Drones] 
provide troops with a 24-hour ‘eye in the sky’, seven days a week. Each aircraft 
can stay aloft for up to 17 hours at a time, loitering over an area and sending back 
real-time imagery of activities on the ground.”). 
 25 See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 14–20. 
 26 See Amitai Etzioni & Oren Etzioni, Pros and Cons of Autonomous Weapons 
Systems, MILITARY REVIEW, http://www.armyupress.army.mil/ 
Journals/Military-Review/English-Edition-Archives/May-June-2017/Pros-and-
Cons-of-Autonomous-Weapons-Systems/ (last visited Nov. 12, 2017); Luis 
Martinez, Pentagon: Fewer Soldiers, More Drones Will Save Money, ABC NEWS 
(Jan. 26, 2012), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/pentagon-fewer-soldiers-drones-
save-money/story?id=15448631; Wayne McLean, Drones are Cheap, Soldiers 
are Not: A Cost-Benefit Analysis of War, THE CONVERSATION (June 25, 2014, 
11:26 PM), https://theconversation.com/drones-are-cheap-soldiers-are-not-a-
cost-benefit-analysis-of-war-27924. 
 27 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 63–64. But see Luke Dormehl, Watch NASA’s 
A.I. Race a Pro Drone Pilot—You’ll Never Guess Who Wins, DIGITAL TRENDS 
(Nov. 22, 2017, 2:04 PM), https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/nasa-drone-
10 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 1 
get hungry . . . . They’re not afraid. They don’t forget their orders. 
They don’t care if the guy next to them has just been shot[,]”28 and 
the commander of an AWS need not write a letter home to a loved 
one if it is damaged or falls on the field.29 And as we have learned, 
one can mount weapons on them30 in the hopes that they or their 
operators can employ those weapons with machine-like precision.31 
The U.S. military has fielded a wide variety of stationary, 
mobile, and flight-capable, remotely-operated, semi-autonomous, 
and fully autonomous armed and unarmed devices.32 Remotely-
piloted or autonomous devices of varying degree patrol the 
battlefield with human partners, clear explosives, conduct high-risk 
entries into opposed locations, provide military leaders and “boots 
                                                
racing/ (reporting that a human drone piloted defeated an A.I. driven drone in a 
series of races, where “humanity came out of the competition as messier but more 
creative, whereas the A.I.-powered bot exhibited machine-like precision and 
consistency”). 
 28 SINGER, supra note 5, at 63. 
 29 Peter Singer, Military Robots and the Future of War, TED, 
https://www.ted.com/talks/pw_singer_on_robots_of_war/details (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2017) [hereinafter Singer, TED Talk]. 
 30 See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 78–79 
(describing the rush to determine the practical and legal feasibility of arming 
Predator drones, in the specific context of the hunt for Osama bin Laden); PLAW 
ET AL., supra note 5, at 20, 23–25 (describing the arming the Predator and “[t]he 
Coming of the Reaper”); SINGER, supra note 5, at 34, 211 (describing that “[t]he 
idea then arose to arm the drone by mounting laser-guided Hellfire missiles on the 
wings” and noting that “[w]ith Predator, it was almost, ‘Hey we got this thing, 
let’s arm it’”). 
 31 See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 47–48 (providing a table that captures data 
from multiple sources describing the ratio of militants to civilian drone strike 
casualties and noting a clearly diminishing trend of civilian casualties as U.S. 
drone use continued); SINGER, supra note 5, at 31 (noting that when describing 
the arming configuration of a land-based robot, “[t]he weapon . . . isn’t cradled in 
the soldier’s arms, moving slightly with each breath or heartbeat. Instead it is 
locked into a stable platform . . . [thereby] eliminating the majority of shooting 
errors” one can expect with a human shooter) (internal quotation omitted); Blank, 
supra note 5, at 687, 693. 
 32 E.g., ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 10–25 
(providing an order of robotic battle). 
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on the ground” increased situational awareness, and, in some cases, 
identify and neutralize threats.33 
It is reasonable to presume that the manufacturers of these 
devices would no doubt attest that all of these missions translate 
neatly into the context of domestic law enforcement.34 As I 
previously noted, much has been written about the United States 
military’s use of AWS, specifically drones, in fighting the war on 
terror.35 Further analysis of this issue exceeds the scope of this paper. 
However, it has become increasingly apparent that the use of these 
devices has changed warfare forever.36 
III.  SCOPING LAW ENFORCEMENT ISSUES INVOLVING “ROBOTS” 
AND “AUTONOMY.” 
This is not a technical paper, and instead makes several 
assumptions to avoid getting bogged down in programming jargon 
                                                
 33 Id. 
 34 See Kristin Bergtora Sandvik, The Political and Moral Economies of Dual 
Technology Transfers: Arming Police Drones, in DRONES AND UNMANNED 
AERIAL SYSTEMS 46, 56–58 (Ales Zavrsnik ed., Springer Int’l Pub. 2016). 
 35 See ARKIN, UNMANNED, supra note 5, at 147–75; DRONES AND UNMANNED 
AERIAL SYSTEMS (Ales Zavrsnik ed., Springer Int’l Pub. 2016); PLAW ET. AL., 
supra note 5, at 13-63; SINGER, supra note 5, at 19–41; Blank, supra note 5; Perritt 
Jr. & Sprague, supra note 5; Michael N. Schmitt, Extraterritorial Lethal 
Targeting: Deconstructing the Logic of International Law, 52 COLUM. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L. 77 (2013). 
 36 E.g., PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 287–98 (“Virtually all analysts believe 
that the global spread of both unarmed and armed UAVs will only expand 
exponentially in the years to come.”) (quoting D. M. Gormley, a senior lecturer 
in military affairs at the University of Pittsburgh’s Graduate School of Public and 
International Affairs); SINGER, supra note 5, at 37 (”[B]y 2008, there were 5331 
drones in the U.S. military’s inventory, almost double the amount of manned 
planes . . . [and that] given the growth trends, it is not unreasonable to postulate 
future conflicts involving tens of thousands.”); Anthony Dworkin, Drones and 
Targeted Killing: Defining A European Position, 84 EUR. COUNCIL ON FOREIGN 
REL. 2–10 (2013) (“Armed drones or unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) are now 
the United States’ weapons platform of choice in its military campaign against the 
dispersed terrorist networks of al-Qaeda . . . [because] [t]hey offer an 
unprecedented ability to track and kill individuals with great precision, without 
any risk to the lives of the forces that use them, and a much lower cost than 
traditional manned aircraft.”). 
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such as “representational choices” and the advantages or 
disadvantages of “if/then” programming as compared to “while” 
statements.37 Instead, this paper presumes a near-future state where 
sensor, computing, and mobility technology have reached a level of 
sophistication where a robot’s ability to “sense-think-act” is near 
equal to that of its human counterparts.38 Given this assumption, 
there are several foreseeable means in which law enforcement could 
employ robots of varying complexity and capability. 
U.S. law enforcement already uses specialized robots for 
activities like bomb disposal39 and high-risk entry.40 But I believe the 
future of robotic policing in the United States lies in what I will 
loosely label as “patrol.”41 Patrol largely entails police presence 
                                                
 37 See generally ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17 
(outlining the issues, challenges, and opportunities for programming lethal 
autonomy in battlefield robots). 
 38 SINGER, supra note 5, at 67; see also Alan L. Schuller, At the Crossroads of 
Control: The Intersection of Artificial Intelligence in Autonomous Weapon 
Systems with International Humanitarian Law, 8 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 379, 392–
97 (2017) [hereinafter Schuller, Crossroads] (describing this ability as “Observe, 
Orient, Decide, Act” and detailing each phase). 
 39 See Michael Wilson, How the Bomb Squad Disabled a Second Explosive in 
the Chelsea Bombing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 5, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/05/nyregion/chelsea-bombing-trial.html. 
 40 E.g., E.B. Boyd, Is Police Use of Force About to Get Worse—With Robots?, 
POLITICO MAG. (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.politico.com/magazine/story/ 
2016/09/police-robots-ethics-debate-214273 (“Early Monday morning, FBI 
agents and New Jersey police officers used a bomb-squad robot to try to defuse 
the makeshift bombs found near a train station in Elizabeth. (The explosives ended 
up detonating after police used the machine to try to cut a wire.) Earlier this 
month, sheriff’s deputies from Los Angeles used a robot to disarm a violent 
suspect who had barricaded himself inside a berm in a Southern California desert. 
And last Friday, another robot was used to force doors open as police searched 
for a gunman hiding out in an Amtrak train.”). 
 41 See JOHN P. CRANK, UNDERSTANDING POLICE CULTURE 45 (2d ed., 
Routledge 2015) (noting “[t]he contemporary practice of police patrol, called 
random preventive patrol, is based on a philosophy of geographic crime 
deterrence” and stating that these patrols, “whose effectiveness is unquestioned in 
most police organizations” are anything but random and allow police officers 
“many opportunities for proactive police work”); DICTIONARY OF POLICING 188 
(Tim Newburn & Peter Neyroud eds. 2008) (defining patrol and noting that 
“[t]hrough patrol duties the police perform a number of broad functions, including 
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within a specified area to both deter crime and shorten response time 
in the event crime occurs.42 Furthermore, when discussing patrol 
robots in the context of domestic law enforcement, it will be useful 
to further separate their use into several separate interrelated 
categories. 
A. Independent v. joint patrols. 
The first category distinguishes between an independent patrol 
as opposed to a joint patrol. In this paper, an independent patrol will 
refer to a patrol profile where a robot, remotely-operated or 
autonomous, operates alone. Conversely, a joint patrol will refer to 
a patrol profile where a robot may operate with a human “partner” 
or partners.43 Further, independent patrols may become joint patrols 
and vice versa depending upon many factors such as the standard 
procedures of the agency in question, the technology available, and 
the facts on the ground of the real-time situation involved.44 
Additionally, there is a distinction between an independent patrol 
and a police unit responding to a specific incident. 
                                                
the prevention and detection of criminal behavior (sic), the management of public 
order problems and traffic occurrences, and the provision of assistance to the 
public”). 
 42 See CRANK, supra note 41, at 43–50. 
 43 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 132–34 (describing that the likely future first 
phase of integrating robots into military and police operations will involve 
partnering between humans and robots: “One example . . . is the through-the-door 
procedure often used by police and soldiers to enter an urban dwelling . . . [where] 
one kicks in the door then pulls back so another can enter low and move left, 
followed by an another who enters high and moves right, etc. . . . . [T]he team will 
consist of robot platforms working with one or more human teammates as a 
cohesive unit.”). 
 44 See id. at 134 (noting that one expert, David Bruemmer at the Idaho National 
Lab, believes that “[o]ver time . . . robots will have ‘dynamic autonomy’ built in, 
where the amount of ‘leash’ the robots are given is determined less by any ideal 
of keeping humans ‘in the loop’ and more by their human teammate’s experience 
and trust level . . . . Trust [in this context refers to] having a proper sense of what 
the other is capable of, as well as being correct in your expectations of what the 
other will do.”). 
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B. Levels of autonomy. 
Here, I break down robots into three categories: (1) remotely-
operated; (2) semi-autonomous; and (3) fully autonomous. The first 
two categories have a human being well-established “in the loop.”45 
It is important to separate these levels because as this technology 
begins to take hold and proliferate within domestic U.S. law 
enforcement, there should be a generally inverse relationship 
between autonomy and lethality. 
A remotely-operated robot has a human operator that controls 
the device. Its sensors feed information to the operator, and the 
operator takes the information from the sensors, maneuvers the 
device, and uses whatever tools with which the device is equipped, 
to interact with the operating environment. To large extent, a 
remotely-operated robot has a human not just “in the loop,” but that 
human is deciding how fast to draw the loop, how big the loop is, if 
the loop should have a color and what that color should be. 
A semi-autonomous robot has a human controller, but the 
responsibilities for operating the device are shared between the 
human and the robot’s onboard computer.46 For the purposes of this 
paper, the real decision point between who should act, the robot or 
the human, turns at the point where armed force would be 
employed.47 For example, consider a human patrol officer arriving 
on the scene of a domestic violence call and deploying a small, 
unmanned aviation system from the trunk of her vehicle. Upon 
launch, the UAS establishes a real-time video link with an officer 
                                                
 45 See id. at 123–24 (describing the go-to phrase to capture the idea that humans 
maintain control over certain robotic operations, but most specifically, the 
employment of force and referring to the “observe, orient, decide, act (OODA)” 
loop that is used as model to analyze action). 
 46 See CAPTAIN ANDREW NORRIS, LEGAL ISSUES RELATING TO UNMANNED 
MARITIME SYSTEMS MONOGRAPH, U.S. NAVAL WAR C. R. 13, 14 (2013); 
Michael N. Schmitt & Jeffrey S. Thurnher, “Out of the Loop”: Autonomous 
Weapon Systems and the Law of Armed Conflict, 4 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 231, 236 
(2013); Kenneth Anderson & Matthew Waxman, Debating Autonomous Weapon 
Systems, Their Ethics, and Their Regulation Under International Law, in OXFORD 
HANDBOOK ON LAW, REGULATION, AND TECHNOLOGY 1100-1103 (Oxford Univ. 
Press 2017). 
 47 See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 46, at 234–36. 
OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement 15 
back at the station house, who can monitor the scene and has the 
ability to deploy any additional tools aboard the UAS. But the UAS 
is “smart” enough to always fly at the optimal distance from its 
human partner without any input from the remotely sited human 
operator.48 Additionally, this category includes a drone operated by 
its human partner on scene. 
As for the third category, there are varying degrees of “fully 
autonomous” which essentially turn on whether the computer 
processor can “learn” from interacting with its environment49 or 
merely just react to sensor stimulus.50 This is overlaid by the extent 
a human being could prevent the robot from taking some sort of 
action after its deployment and again by programming decisions.51 
Thus, there are gradients of “full autonomy” within the spectrum of 
categories described above.52 When I use the term autonomous, I 
assume that the devices will be truly fully autonomous in that they 
will not only be able to react to sensor stimuli, but will be able to 
adjust their initial and potential future reactions based on that 
changing stimuli and without human input, take action in a 
timeframe in which it is meaningful for the device to do so.53 
                                                
 48 See Michael Horowitz, The Ethics and Morality of Robotic Warfare, 145 
DAEDALUS 25, n.18 (2016) (noting that the U.S. Navy’s prototype X-47B can take 
off and land on its own). 
 49 See Zoe Bernard, So, What Is Machine Learning Anyways? Here’s a Quick 
Breakdown, BUS. INSIDER (Nov. 23, 2017, 12:00 PM), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-is-machine-learning-quick-explainer-
2017-11; Cade Metz, Building A.I. That Can Build A.I., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 5, 
2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/05/technology/machine-learning-
artificial-intelligence-ai.html (“Neural networks are rapidly accelerating the 
development of A.I. Rather than building an image-recognition service or a 
language translation app by hand, one line of code at a time, engineers can much 
more quickly build an algorithm that learns tasks on its own.”); Cade Metz, 
Finally, Neural Networks That Actually Work, WIRED (Apr. 21, 2015, 5:45 AM), 
https://www.wired.com/2015/04/jeff-dean/. 
 50 See Sadler, supra note 13, at 45; Schuller, supra note 38, at 390–409. 
 51 See Schmitt & Thurnher, supra note 46, at 234–36; Schuller, supra note 38, 
at 417–20. 
 52 See Anderson & Waxman, supra note 46, at 1100–03. 
 53 Id. 
16 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 1 
C. Operational54 v. tactical55 patrol. 
Robots do not have the same physical or psychological 
biological limitations as humans.56 They do not get tired or lose 
focus and are generally limited in their length of operation only by 
their onboard fuel or power.57 This distinction helps bring the 
difference between operational and tactical policing into contrast. 
Military planners have long separated and labeled different 
levels of warfare.58 While police work is not warfare, the labels the 
military uses to describe a layered approach to analyzing objectives 
can easily apply in the scope of modern policing and provides a 
helpful framing tool. 
“The operational level . . . links the tactical employment of 
forces to [meet a] . . . strategic objective.”59 Here, that strategic 
objective is public safety and security. In the law enforcement 
context, operational level leadership and capabilities should or do 
inform decision making in “determin[ing] how, when, where, and 
for what purpose . . . [tactical-level] forces will be employed, to 
influence [a criminal’s] disposition before [police interaction], to 
deter . . . [criminal activities], and to assure [the public,] to achieve 
[public safety and security].”60 For example, a domestic law 
enforcement agency could employ several medium-sized UAS to 
provide persistent, real-time surveillance of a wide area of 
responsibility so that police leadership better understand the 
                                                
 54 See JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, JOINT OPERATIONS, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (Jan. 
17, 2017), 
http://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/jp3_0_20170117.pdf; 
Robert Bateman, Understanding Military Strategy and the Four Levels of War, 
ESQUIRE (Nov. 25, 2015), http://www.esquire.com/news-politics/politics/news 
/a39985/four-levels-of-war/. 
 55 See JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, supra note 54. 
 56 See supra notes 26–27. 
 57 SINGER, supra note 5, at 88–89 (describing the various novel ways currently 
being developed to power “robots”). 
 58 See supra note 54. 
 59 JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, supra note 54. 
 60 Id.; see also Trevor Mogg, Drones are Helping French Traffic Cops Catch 
Hundreds of Dangerous Drivers, DIGITAL TRENDS (Nov. 14, 2017, 11:35 PM), 
https://www.digitaltrends.com/cool-tech/drones-help-french-traffic-cops/. 
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environment and can more effectively deploy individual patrol 
forces.61 Open and transparent operational-level police work 
theoretically also has a deterrent effect on criminal activity by 
establishing a sort of wide ranging visible “omnipresence” beyond 
the scale provided by individual, tactical-level patrols.62 
That leads into the idea that operational-level activities differ 
from tactical activities in terms of scope.63 In short, “[t]actics is the 
employment, ordered arrangement, and directed action of forces in 
relation to each other.”64 In police work, it is the street cop or the 
vehicle patrol. Ideally, tactical actions are informed by operational 
planning, and in turn tactical patrols feed information to the 
operational level so that they can continuously improve in a never-
ending feedback loop.65 
Operational-level use of robot technology, which at its most 
basic would cover more ground, brings with it different issues than 
those in the previous example of the tactical-level patrol officer 
fielding the UAS from the trunk of her patrol cruiser for back up or 
support in responding to the domestic violence call. 
                                                
 61 Peter Finn, Domestic Use of Aerial Drones by Law Enforcement Likely to 
Prompt Privacy Debate, WASH. POST (Jan. 23, 2011, 12:56 AM), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/01/22/ 
AR2011012204111.html?sid=ST2011012204147 (noting that “[d]rones raise the 
prospect of much more pervasive surveillance”) (internal quotations removed); 
Monte Reel, Secret Cameras Record Baltimore’s Every Move from Above, 
BLOOMBERG (Aug. 23, 2016) https://www.bloomberg.com/features/2016-
baltimore-secret-surveillance/ (describing Baltimore’s practice of employing a 
small manned aircraft with “wide-angle cameras [capable of capturing] an area 
roughly 30 square miles and continuously transmitting real-time images to 
analysts on the ground”). 
 62 John Surico, Omnipresence Is the Newest NYPD Tactic You’ve Never Heard 
Of, VICE (Oct. 20, 2014), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/vdpq7m/ 
omnipresence-is-the-newest-nypd-tactic-youve-never-heard-of-1020 (noting that 
omnipresence is the “perfect word” to describe NYPD’s patrol strategy of 
seemingly being everywhere). 
 63 See JOINT PUBLICATION 3-0, supra note 54. 
 64 Id. 
 65 Id. 
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IV.  LAW AND POLICY OVERVIEW 
This section provides an overview of U.S. constitutional search 
and seizure law with a brief discussion on how the international 
standards for the use of force compare to the U.S. standards. It 
concludes with a discussion of U.S. federal law, regulation, and 
policy on law enforcement use of drones, along with a survey of 
U.S. state law on the subject. 
A. Constitutional search requirements. 
I will not dwell on the use of remotely piloted, semi-
autonomous, or fully autonomous drones in the context of 
“operational” level police surveillance. Professor Christopher Jenks 
of Southern Methodist University’s Dedman School of Law fully 
analyzed the existing state of the law in his excellent piece State 
Labs of Federalism and Law Enforcement “Drone” Use, published 
in the Washington and Lee Law Review in the Summer of 2015.66 
Further, Professor Gregory McNeal of Pepperdine University has 
also written extensively on the subject.67 However, the following is 
a brief summary of the current state of the law. 
A “search” is a quest for evidence of criminal wrongdoing by 
agents of the government into an area or object in which a person 
has a reasonable expectation of privacy.68 The Fourth Amendment 
of the Constitution governs searches.69 It reads: 
[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, 
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath 
                                                
 66 Jenks, supra note 7, at 1389; see also McNeal, Drones and the Future of 
Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7, at 406–08; THOMPSON II, supra note 10, at 4–
17. 
 67 See McNeal, Drones and Aerial Surveillance, Considerations for 
Legislatures, supra note 10 (disfavoring strongly the continued use of the warrant 
requirement for police unmanned aerial surveillance); McNeal, Drones and the 
Future of Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7. 
 68 E.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1960) (Harlan, J., concurring) 
(noting that a Fourth Amendment analysis into search activity requires both a 
subjective belief that the subject had an expectation of privacy and an objective 
requirement that the expectation be reasonable). 
 69 See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and 
the persons or things to be seized.70 
Courts have long held that where people have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy, searches are only constitutional if they were 
supported by an appropriately-issued warrant, based on probable 
cause that evidence of a particular crime is in a particular place, at a 
particular time.71 Courts, however, have read in exceptions to the 
“warrant” requirement to account for “exigencies” or emergencies 
where there is a threat to life72 or the destruction of evidence73 and 
“plain view” discoveries, where a police officer discovers evidence 
of a crime where they are in a place they are otherwise lawfully 
entitled to be.74 
As American law enforcement agencies became more and more 
technologically advanced, largely in response to the so-called war-
on-drugs, the Supreme Court expanded this plain view exception by 
creating an “open view” doctrine that it applied where law 
enforcement used aircraft and helicopters to look for evidence of 
illegal drug production.75 The Supreme Court found, in a series of 
cases, that it was not unconstitutional for police to use information 
regarding illegal activity that they discovered without first obtaining 
a warrant, while on patrol in an aircraft or helicopter operating 
within the navigable airspace above a location because the evidence 
of criminal wrongdoing was in open view of the police in the aircraft 
or helicopter and that it was not reasonable to have an expectation 
                                                
 70 Id. 
 71 See Katz, 389 U.S. at 361. 
 72 See Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398, 406–07 (2006); Payton v. New 
York, 445 U.S. 573, 583, 587–88 (1980). 
 73 See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 460 (2011); Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 
23, 40 (1963). 
 74 See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 (1971) (“It is well 
established that under certain circumstances the police may seize evidence in plain 
view without a warrant.”). 
 75 See BALKO, supra note 12, at 173–74; THOMPSON II, supra note 10, at 7–8; 
McNeal, Drones and the Future of Aerial Surveillance, supra note 7, at 373–79 
(describing the history of the Supreme Court considering manned aerial 
surveillance in the law enforcement context by tracing the path from California 
v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207, 213 (1986) to Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 
U.S. 227, 239 (1986) to Florida v. Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989)). 
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of privacy from observation despite the greater vantage point of the 
police provided by that aircraft.76 The Supreme Court reasoned that 
the enhanced vantage merely provided a vehicle for the police to use 
their normal means of observing criminal activity from an area they 
were otherwise authorized to be, but the Court was later unwilling 
to extend its acceptance of warrantless searches where the police 
used thermal imagery77 or GPS monitoring with a device attached to 
a vehicle78 to acquire evidence of criminality, in part because these 
methods exceeded human detection capabilities and have the 
potential to intrude upon places in which people can reasonably 
expect privacy. 
B. Constitutional seizure requirements. 
Like police searches in the United States, police use of force, 
including deadly force, is governed by the Fourth Amendment to the 
Constitution, because police use of force is a “seizure.”79 Deadly 
force is that force which, based on the circumstances, creates a 
“substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.”80 “Generally, 
police officers have the authority to use deadly force, to cause the 
death of another human being, when their life or the life of another 
person is jeopardized.”81 This includes circumstances where police 
“have probable cause to believe a [fleeing felon] poses a risk to the 
safety of police officers or the community,”82 but that a resort to 
force must be reasonable under the totality of the circumstances.83 
                                                
 76 See supra note 75. 
 77 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001). 
 78 United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 404–06 (2012). 
 79 See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985); U.S. v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 
544, 553 (1980), reh’g denied, 448 U.S. 908 (1980). 
 80 Tim Longo, Defining Instrumentalities of Deadly Force, 27 TOURO L. REV. 
261, 271 (2011). 
 81 Michael J. Palmiotto, Use of Deadly Force, in POLICE USE OF FORCE: 
IMPORTANT ISSUES FACING THE POLICE AND THE COMMUNITIES THEY SERVE 35 
(Michael J. Palmiotto ed., 2016). 
 82 See id. at 39. 
 83 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7–9. 
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When police use force, that force must be reasonable and this 
requirement extends to all levels of police use of force.84 Further, 
Courts assess reasonableness through the lens of what a reasonable 
officer on the scene would do, as opposed to applying a post-hoc 
standard of reasonableness, and their analysis does not account for 
the officer’s underlying intent or motivation, but is instead focused 
on the totality of circumstances to which the officer is responding.85 
In examining the totality of the circumstances, Courts “must 
embody an allowance for the fact that police officers are often forced 
to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that are tense, 
uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount of force that is 
necessary in a particular situation.”86 
C. International legal standards on the use of force. 
The application of international law to domestic U.S. law 
enforcement activities is a subject with little practical effect outside 
the realm of academia.87 There are many reasons for this. Some are: 
that as a general proposition, international legal paradigms often 
lack enforcement mechanisms;88 the United States’ trend away from 
strict adherence to international law and treaties and its habit of 
attaching Reservations, Understandings, and Declarations (RUD) to 
account for the nuances of the American governmental system;89 the 
tendency of its courts to read international legal obligations 
                                                
 84 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 381–84 (2007). 
 85 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 396–97 (1989). 
 86 Id. 
 87 See generally Hamilton, Police Robots and the Law, supra note 7, at 4. 
 88 But see Frederic L. Kirgis, Enforcing International Law, AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. 
(Jan. 22, 1996), https://www.asil.org/insights/volume/1/issue/1/enforcing-
international-law. 
 89 See Willem van Genugten, The United States’ Reservations to the ICCPR; 
International Law versus God’s Own Constitution, in THE ROLE OF THE NATION-
STATE IN THE 21ST CENTURY 35-46 (M. Castermans-Holleman, F. van Hoof & J. 
Smith eds., 1998) (describing the history of the United States’ Reservations to the 
International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)); M.S., Why the 
Sheriff Should Follow the Law, ECONOMIST (May 23, 2014), 
https://www.economist.com/blogs/democracyinamerica/2014/05/america-and-
international-law. 
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narrowly;90 its reluctance to be subject to international institutions;91 
Federalism concerns;92 and a persistent belief in American 
exceptionalism in matters that pertain to the application of 
Constitutional law in domestic affairs.93 Regardless, a quick look at 
international legal standards for the use of force in domestic law 
enforcement will provide some helpful context with the analysis of 
law enforcement use of drones and robots later in the paper. 
“The use of force in law enforcement operations is mainly 
governed by international human rights law . . . [and] [t]he most 
relevant rights as regards the use of force in law enforcement is the 
right to life.”94 To start, the Supreme Court’s reasonableness 
standard is objectively a bit more permissive than the applicable 
international legal standard, which authorizes police use of force 
                                                
 90 E.g., Sale v. Haitian Centers Council Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 182 (1993) 
(interpreting U.S. international obligations regarding the protection of refugees 
by prohibiting their return to a location where there is danger only being triggered 
upon their actual arrival into the United States). 
 91 See Ben Cardin, The South China Sea is the Reason the United States Must 
Ratify UNCLOS, FOREIGN POL’Y (Jul. 13, 2016, 2:30 PM), 
http://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/13/the-south-china-sea-is-the-reason-the-
united-states-must-ratify-unclos/; Harold Hongju Koh, Dena Adler, Joanna 
Dafoe, Peter Posada, Conor Dwyer Reynolds & Eugene Rusyn, Trump’s So-
Called Withdrawal from Paris: Far From Over, JUST SECURITY (June 2, 2017, 
8:44 AM), https://www.justsecurity.org/41612/trumps-so-called-withdrawal-
paris/ (describing President Bush’s act of “unsigning” the Rome Statute 
establishing the International Criminal Court in the context of President Trump’s 
attempt to withdraw from the Paris climate accords). 
 92 See Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504–07 (2008) (holding that while 
externally, the United States has international legal obligations to abide by treaties 
in which it is a party, only self-executing treaties are enforceable as the law of the 
land within the United States). 
 93 See generally Garrett Epps, Constitutional Myth #10: International Law is a 
Threat to the Constitution, ATLANTIC (Jul. 28, 2011), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/national/archive/2011/07/constitutional-myth-10-
international-law-is-a-threat-to-the-constitution/242683/; van Genugten, supra 
note 89. 
 94 The Use of Force in Law Enforcement Operations, INT’L COMMITTEE OF THE 
RED CROSS (Sep. 23, 2015), https://www.icrc.org/en/document/use-force-law-
enforcement-operations. 
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only as a last resort.95 Furthermore, international standards, as 
articulated in the United Nations Code of Conduct for Law 
Enforcement and the UN Basic Principles on the Use of Force and 
Firearms by Law Enforcement Officials (BPUFF), provide that 
police may use deadly force in “[s]elf-defence [sic] or defence [sic] 
of others against the imminent threat of death or serious injury; [to 
prevent] the perpetration of a particularly serious crime involving 
grave threat to life; [to arrest] a person presenting a danger of 
perpetrating such a crime and resisting authority, or prevention of 
his or her escape.”96 While many U.S. law enforcement agencies 
have use-of-force policies that are substantially similar to the 
international standards, especially as it pertains to the use of force 
in self-defense, including the defense of others, there are slight 
differences that may play out factually between the international 
standards and what a U.S. court may find as a “reasonable” 
application of police force.97 
D. Federal law and policy pertaining to law enforcement “drone” 
use. 
UAS in America are governed federally by the Federal Aviation 
Administration (“FAA”), but there is no functionally equivalent 
regulatory agency that governs terrestrial remotely-operated or 
autonomous devices.98 The FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 
2012 (“FAA Act”)99 included “specific requirements that 
government agencies must follow in order to operate a drone” in the 
United States, but was silent on armed drones.100 After the FAA Act, 
“[t]he FAA and the Department of Justice [(“DOJ”)] created a 
Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) to implement a streamlined 
training and authorization process to enable [state] law enforcement 
agencies to operate [drones] within the United States safely, 
                                                
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. 
 97 See Brumfield, supra note 7, at 567–69. 
 98 See id. at 550. 
 99 FAA Modernization and Reform Act of 2012, H.R. 658, 112th Cong. (2012) 
(enacted). 
 100 Brumfield, supra note 7, at 550–51. 
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effectively, and lawfully.”101 “The MOU establishes . . . 
requirements for a [law enforcement agency] to gain [FAA] 
authorization to operate a drone”102 and limits current law 
enforcement operations to remotely piloted “drones” within sight of 
their operator, in a “defined incident perimeter (‘DIP’)” at an 
altitude no higher than 400 feet, during daylight hours only, with no 
ability to pursue or fly over groups of people or major roadways.103 
Further, DOJ also recently released guidance to DOJ components 
including the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) on using 
“drones” for law enforcement purposes.104 The DOJ guidance is 
largely non-substantive and primarily reiterates broad themes 
including the importance of protecting Constitutional rights, the 
value of restraint in planning and executing operations involving 
drones and UAS, and the importance of both accountability and 
transparency in conducting drone operations.105 Additionally, in 
2015, President Obama issued a Memorandum outlining his views 
on the Federal Government’s use of drones, specifically as they 
relate to potential privacy and civil liberties concerns.106 
                                                
 101 Id. at 552. 
 102 Id. at 553. 
 103 See id. at n.69–70 (quoting Memorandum of Understanding between FAA, 
UAS Integration Office & The U.S. DOJ, Office of Justice Programs, Nat’l Inst. 
Of Justice Concerning Operation of UAS by Law Enforcement Agencies 5, 7 
(2013), https://alea.org/images/UAS/DOJ%20FAA%20MOU.pdf). 
 104 See Department of Justice Policy Guidance Domestic Use of Unmanned 
Aircraft Systems, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (May 22, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/file/441266. 
 105 Id. 
 106 See Memorandum on Promoting Economic Competitiveness While 
Safeguarding Privacy, Civil Rights, and Civil Liberties in Domestic Use of 
Unmanned Aircraft Systems, 80 Fed. Reg. 9355, 9355–58 (Feb. 15, 2015), 
https://www.federalregister.gov/documents/2015/02/20/2015-03727/promoting-
economic-competitiveness-while-safeguarding-privacy-civil-rights-and-civil-
liberties-in; see also Gregory S. McNeal, What You Need to Know About the 
Government’s Drone Privacy Rules, FORBES (Feb. 15, 2015, 1:40 PM), 
https://www.forbes.com/sites/gregorymcneal/2015/02/15/the-drones-are-
coming-heres-what-president-obama-thinks-about-privacy/#2eb84a8f3a98. 
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E. Survey of specific state laws that address law enforcement use 
of drones and robots. 
Regulating drone use is an exceedingly hot topic in state 
legislatures, and “[a]t least 38 states were considering legislation 
related to UAS [as of] 2017.”107 In 2016: 
18 states—Alaska, Florida, Idaho, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, 
Montana, Nevada, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia and Wisconsin . . . passed legislation 
requiring law enforcement agencies to obtain a search warrant to use 
UAS for surveillance or to conduct a search. One state enacted such 
requirements in 2016.108 
Vermont went further and prohibited law enforcement’s use of 
drones to “investigate, detect, or prosecute crime, or to gather or 
retain data on citizens peacefully exercise[ing] their rights of free 
speech and assembly.109 
Since UAS and drone use became the issue du jour, “[s]ome 
states, including Oregon, Virginia and Wisconsin, have outright 
banned law enforcement agencies from arming drones.”110 
Additionally, “[o]nly North Dakota, so far, has explicitly permitted 
police to put weapons on drones, though only with less-than-lethal 
munitions, such as tear gas, bean bags and Tasers.”111 
                                                
 107 Current Unmanned Aircraft State Law Landscape, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE 
LEGIS. (Sept. 10, 2018), http://www.ncsl.org/research/transportation/ current-
unmanned-aircraft-state-law-landscape.aspx (providing overview of the current 
state of State UAS law). 
 108 2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) State Legislation Update, NAT’L 
CONF. OF STATE LEGIS. (Mar. 20, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/ 
transportation/2016-unmanned-aircraft-systems-uas-state-legislation-
update.aspx. 
 109 Id. 
 110 Boyd, supra note 40; see 2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) State 
Legislation Update, supra note 108. 
 111 Boyd, supra note 40; see also Sidney Fussell, Cops Just Got One Step Closer 
to Killing Americans by Drone, GIZMODO (Mar. 31, 2017, 2:52 PM), 
https://gizmodo.com/cops-just-got-one-step-closer-to-killing-americans-by-d-
1793893015 (describing the Connecticut law, “An Act Concerning the Use and 
Regulation of Drones,” which “effectively bans weaponized drones for everyone 
in the state except police officers, permitting them to use drones equipped with 
tear gas, incendiary and explosive devices[,] and remote deadly weapons”) 
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The state legislative efforts appear focused on UAS and while 
UAS definitely are the proverbial “poster children”112 for the debate 
on automated policing, as discussed above, the U.S. military has 
made great use of land-based robots and remotely-operated 
vehicles113 and indeed, many law enforcement agencies already 
employ land-based devices in a wide variety of configurations, for a 
wide variety of purposes.114 More are no doubt coming.115 Further, 
regardless of whether we are discussing law enforcement use of 
land-based or air-based devices, as long as a human is at the controls 
and making the decisions, the legal concerns are minimized.116 That 
                                                
(emphasis omitted) (quotations omitted); Andrew Hazzard, ND House: Nonlethal 
Drone Weapons Stay Legal for Law Enforcement, DICKINSON PRESS (Feb. 21, 
2017, 7:25 PM), http://www.thedickinsonpress.com/news/4222456-nd-house-
nonlethal-drone-weapons-stay-legal-law-enforcement; Laura Wagner, North 
Dakota Legalizes Armed Police Drones, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Aug. 27, 2015, 7:16 
PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/08/27/435301160/ north-
dakota-legalizes-armed-police-drones; 2016 Unmanned Aircraft Systems (UAS) 
State Legislation Update, supra note 108. 
 112 PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 333 (discussing “drones” as the poster children 
for targeted killing). 
 113 See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 10–20 
(providing a run-down of land-based robots and autonomous vehicles employed 
by the DoD). 
 114 See Boyd, supra note 40 (“In one case, a SWAT team used a robot to reach 
through a window and pull a blanket off of a suicidal person to check whether he 
had a weapon. (He didn’t.) In other cases, robots have swept homes for booby 
traps, and they’re often used to toss tear gas or pepper spray into rooms, to disable 
suspects before officers enter. In the California desert earlier this month, sheriff’s 
deputies used a robot to creep up behind the suspect and take away his rifle while 
he was distracted by helicopters and police officers yelling at him through 
loudspeakers.”). 
 115 See Mike Murphy, Boston Dynamics is Still Making Creepy Robots Under 
SoftBank, QUARTZ (Nov. 13, 2017), https://qz.com/1128469/softbanks-boston-
dynamics-has-a-new-creepy-dog-like-robot-called-spotmini/. 
 116 See David A. Graham, The Dallas Shooting and the Advent of Killer Police 
Robots, ATLANTIC (July 8, 2016), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/news/archive/2016/07/dallas-police-robot/490478/  
(quoting Seth Stoughton, an assistant professor of law at the University of South 
Carolina) (“The circumstances that justify lethal force justify lethal force in 
essentially every form . . . . If someone is shooting at the police, the police are, 
generally speaking, going to be authorized to eliminate that threat by shooting 
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is not to say there are none, but I believe the true issues occur when 
the role of the human “in the loop” is greatly diminished or 
eliminated altogether.117 
Though this is not a current issue, I suspect it will be one that we 
will need to address on the near horizon. And I am assuming a sort 
of “lead-follow” relationship between the military and the police 
when it comes to employing remotely-operated and autonomous 
devices of varying degrees.118 The military sets the standard and the 
technology, and, to the extent it exists, the doctrine flows from the 
military to the police.119 Granted, the military and the police have 
significantly different core functions,120 but there is some mission 
overlap,121 and there is also a long history of coordination on tactics 
and equipment transfers between the two.122 Though for now, while 
some would argue that the technology currently exists to empower 
robots to make deadly force decisions, the military has yet to 
publicly acknowledge that it has taken, or that it even intends to take, 
the human out of the loop when it comes to employing deadly 
force.123 Thus, and leaving aside for the moment the key mission 
                                                
them, or by stabbing them with a knife, or by running them over with a vehicle. 
Once lethal force is justified and appropriate, the method of delivery . . . [is likely 
not] legally relevant.”). 
 117 Id. (noting that once you “[m]ove away from the realm of remote-controlled 
devices into the world of autonomous or partially autonomous robots that could 
deliver lethal or even non-lethal, force . . . the concerns mount”). 
 118 See CRANK, supra note 41, at 119. See generally KRISTIAN WILLIAMS, OUR 
ENEMIES IN BLUE (3d ed. 2015). 
 119 Supra note 118. 
 120 See CRANK, supra note 41, at 118 (“The police, of course, are not a military 
unit fighting a war—their principal clients are citizens, and their work is 
dominated by petty peace-keeping problems involving rowdy teenagers, angry 
spouses and neighbors, and other persistent social problems.”). 
 121 See, e.g., Gary Cordner & Kathryn Scarborough, Information Sharing: 
Exploring the Intersection of Policing with National and Military Intelligence, 6 
HOMELAND SECURITY AFF. 1, 5–11, 14–15 (Jan. 2010),. 
 122 See BALKO, supra note 12, at 114–15; WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 323–
24. 
 123 E.g., U.S. Dep’t of Def. Directive 3000.09, Autonomy in Weapon Systems 
(DoD 2012), 
http://www.esd.whs.mil/Portals/54/Documents/DD/issuances/dodd/300009p.pdf 
(noting that it is DoD policy that “[a]utonomous and semi-autonomous weapon 
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distinctions between the law enforcement and military activities, it 
is reasonable to conclude that domestic police will not consider 
taking the human out of the loop in deadly force scenarios until the 
military has done so first. 
V.  THE TENSIONS INVOLVED WITH POLICE USE OF REMOTELY-
OPERATED, SEMI-AUTONOMOUS, AND FULLY AUTONOMOUS 
TECHNOLOGY IN DOMESTIC LAW ENFORCEMENT. 
As is the case with most things, police use of remotely-operated, 
semi-autonomous, and fully autonomous technology to execute 
their mission has both benefits and risks. 
A. What are the benefits? 
The primary benefits of police use of remotely-operated, semi-
autonomous, and fully autonomous technology to execute their 
mission are increased capacity and improvements to their 
capabilities. 
1. Increased capacity. 
The first benefit of the trend toward more automated police work 
is that it will likely increase law enforcement agencies’ capacity by 
allowing them to better stretch their operational budgets.124 This is 
an “efficiency” benefit. When assessing operational costs of robotic 
or drone police devices, factors such as size, capabilities, and 
complexity will likely be relevant. One can also imagine a sliding 
scale of cost with remotely-operated devices at the lower end, semi-
autonomous devices in the middle, and fully autonomous devices at 
the high end.125 
                                                
systems shall be designed to allow commanders and operators to exercise 
appropriate levels of human judgment over the use of force”). 
 124 See Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 26, at 72-73 (noting that in the military 
context, there are long-term savings that could be achieved through fielding an 
army of military robots); John Seewer, Drones Become Crime Fighting Tool, But 
Perfection is Elusive, WASH. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2017), 
https://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/nov/3/drones-become-crime-
fighting-tool-but-perfection-i/.  
 125 See Gabriel Nica, Level 5 Autonomous Technology Not Possible Yet, Claims 
BMW, BMW BLOG (Oct. 5, 2017), http://www.bmwblog.com/2017/10/05/level-
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Further, “operational level” devices will likely cost more than 
“tactical” devices. For example, a large flying device that can 
engage in “operational” patrolling for long periods of time will 
likely cost more than a small flying device intended for tactical 
patrolling with or in support of a human officer because of the size 
and complexity of the operational device as compared to the tactical 
device.126 This is, of course, not a rule, in that one can also imagine 
a more complex tactical device that would need more advanced 
programming because it would be more likely to interact with the 
public,127 especially if that tactical device were capable of employing 
force, deadly or otherwise. 
Currently, while it is clear that police agencies around the 
country are increasing both the quantity and quality of the robots 
and drones in their inventories, these devices still remain relatively 
costly.128 As is the case with most technologies, though, these costs 
will likely diminish over time,129 especially if America begins 
winding down its expeditionary military activities, which will 
inevitably result in a stockpile of gear available for transfer to law 
enforcement agencies under the so-called federal 1033 program, 
which I discuss in more detail below.130 Thus, in the near future, 
purchasing a robot or drone will generally be cheaper or provide 
                                                
5-autonomous-technology-not-possible-yet-claims-bmw/ (describing a variable 
pricing scheme based on autonomy level in the context of autonomous vehicles). 
 126 Compare PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 24 (calculating that a Predator drone 
costs approximately $5 million per unit), with David Hernandez, San Diego 
County Sheriff’s Department Expands Drone Program, GOV’T TECH. (Oct. 30, 
2017), http://www.govtech.com/public-safety/San-Diego-County-Sheriffs-
Department-Expands-Drone-Program.html (reporting that it costs the San Diego 
police department $125,000-$165,000 per year to operate their drone program 
using “the same kind [of drones] found on the shelves at any electronics store”). 
 127 See IBM Watson, IBM Watson: How it Works, YOUTUBE (Oct. 7, 2014), 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_Xcmh1LQB9I. 
 128 See Gettinger, supra note 9. 
 129 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 130. 
 130 See generally Mission, DEF. LOGISTICS AGENCY, 
http://www.dla.mil/DispositionServices/About/Mission.aspx (last visited Aug. 
12, 2018) (noting that as “[p]art of the Defense Logistics Agency, DLA 
Disposition Services disposes of excess property received from the military 
services”). 
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better value than training and paying a human patrol officer.131 That 
will either free up scarce fiscal resources through more efficient 
operations or drive increases in police effectiveness by increasing 
the amount of law enforcement resources available for deployment 
within the municipality.132 
The increase in the value of capacity logically relates to the level 
of autonomy. At the tactical level, a remotely piloted robot doesn’t 
save a “body,” it merely transfers the body from the patrol forces 
walking a beat to the division in the police department operating the 
drone.133 This is especially true under the FAA’s existing guidelines, 
which require that a remotely-piloted drone remain within sight of 
its operator.134 The same would hold true for a semi-autonomous unit 
that can maneuver itself, but would depend on a human for more 
complex interactions like employing force. Thus, assuming 
efficiencies through a human support staff that can manage multiple 
tactical autonomous robots beyond a 1:1 ratio, only full autonomy 
optimizes increased capacity at the tactical level.135 A fully 
autonomous robot engaged in tactical-level police work saves 
resources by replacing the human officer, while a fully autonomous 
                                                
 131 Sabrina Cupit, Police in Metro Atlanta Buzzing About Drones, WSB RADIO 
(May 31, 2017, 8:31 PM), http://www.wsbradio.com/news/local/police-metro-
atlanta-buzzing-about-drones/17qHTrzRMkyP59FSwLmQxM/ (reporting that 
police in the Atlanta metro area are claiming that drones are being used “very 
effectively,” so much so, that “they could replace staff people in areas that are 
monitoring crowd controls”). 
 132 See Etzioni & Etzioni, supra note 26. 
 133 See Jack R. Greene & Ralph B. Taylor, Community-Based Policing and Foot 
Patrol: Issues of Theory and Evaluation, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR 
REALITY 195–223 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988). 
 134 See Brumfield, supra note 7, at 553 n.69–70. 
 135 See Anderson & Waxman, supra note 46, at 1101 (“In some cases, a human 
operator might control only a single or very few sets of sensor and weapon units. 
In others, he or she might control or oversee an integrated network of many sensor 
and weapon units, which might operate largely autonomously, though with the 
supervisor able to intervene with respect to any of the weapon units.”); see also 
SINGER, supra note 5, at 75 (“The more autonomy a robot has, the less human 
operators have to support it. As one Pentagon report put it, ‘Having a dedicated 
operator for each robot will not pass the common sense test.’ If robots don’t get 
higher on the autonomy scale, they don’t yield any cost or manpower savings.”). 
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robot that is sophisticated enough to operate independently may 
result in a savings of two officers, in jurisdictions that still deploy 
officers in pairs.136 There are also savings in that it is safe to assume 
that robotic officers will be able to work beyond the normal eight-
hour shifts most human police officers work.137 Again, they do not 
get tired, bored, or hungry, and so the fully autonomous robotic 
officer works more efficiently than its human counterpart.138 
At the operational level, there may be greater capacity increases 
depending upon the capabilities of the operational drone or robot. 
Take, for example, a comparison to a large metropolitan police 
department’s aviation unit.139 A fixed wing UAS will likely have 
greater operational range and longevity than a manned rotary wing 
helicopter.140 Also, assume that the UAS support staff is equal to or 
                                                
 136 See Tom Jackman & Peter Hermann, Police Nationwide Order Officers to 




Christina Sterbenz, Police Around the Country are Making a Complicated Call to 
Increase Officer Safety in the Wake of Dallas and Baton Rouge, BUS. INSIDER 
(Jul. 19, 2016, 7:24 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/problems-of-police-
working-in-pairs-2016-7. 
 137 See generally SINGER, supra note 5, at 62–65. 
 138 Id. 
 139 See LAPD Air Support Unit, POLICE HELICOPTER PILOT, 
http://www.policehelicopterpilot.com/lapd-air-support/ (last visited Nov. 22, 
2017); New York Police Department Aviation Division, POLICE HELICOPTER 
PILOT, http://www.policehelicopterpilot.com/nypd-aviation-unit/ (last visited 
Nov. 22, 2017). 
 140 Compare Praveen Duddu, The 10 Longest Range Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), AIR FORCE TECH. (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.airforce-
technology.com/features/featurethe-top-10-longest-range-unmanned-aerial-
vehicles-uavs/ (describing UAS range, in some cases measured by days), with Bell 
429, BELL HELICOPTER, http://www.bellhelicopter.com/commercial/bell-429 
(last visited Nov. 21, 2017) (claiming a 411 nautical mile range and 4.5 hours of 
endurance), and R44 Raven II Police Helicopter, ROBINSON HELICOPTER, 
https://robinsonheli.com/r44-police-helicopter-specifications/ (claiming a 300 
nautical mile range), and R66 Turbine Police Helicopter, ROBINSON HELICOPTER, 
https://robinsonheli.com/r66-police-helicopter-specifications/ (claiming a 325 
nautical mile range). 
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less than what is required to maintain manned helicopter capability. 
For argument’s sake, then, let us say that a medium-sized UAS has 
a twelve-hour effective flight time141 and is equipped with cameras 
and sensors powerful enough to allow it to cover the entire 
municipality five times on patrol mode during that 12-hour flight.142 
The law enforcement agency has three UAS, and it rotates them 
through so it keeps one on, leaves one in stand-by, and has one off 
for maintenance.143 In one day, the UAS would orbit the 
municipality ten times and gather information that would take 
multiple 3-4 hour helicopter sorties and hundreds of vehicle or foot 
patrols to acquire. If it is remotely piloted, it does so at the cost of 
its one pilot and shared support staff. If it is semi-autonomous and 
doesn’t have a mission profile which requires a human operator, or 
if fully autonomous, it only requires its support staff. 
2. Improved capabilities. 
The second benefit is the increased capabilities autonomous 
police devices provide. This is essentially an “effectiveness” benefit. 
In many cases, even on the battlefield, robots—remotely-operated 
or autonomous devices—merely provide a vehicle for enhanced 
sensors or weapons delivery for their human masters.144 Often, these 
                                                
 141 See Duddu, supra note 140. 
 142 See supra note 61. 
 143 See PLAW ET AL., supra note 5, at 24 tbl.1 (noting that for $20 million, a 
typical Predator system comes with four aircraft). 
 144 See generally GARY SOLIS, THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT 551 (2d ed., 
Cambridge Univ. Press 2016) (quoting Heeyong Daniel Jang, The Lawfulness of 
and Case for Combat Drones in the Fight Against Terrorism, 2 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 
1, 12 (2013) and describing the sensor set up on modern military drones:“[T]he 
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Scanners Shed Light on Terror Attack Suspect’s Movements, NEWSDAY (Nov. 1, 
2017, 9:26 PM), https://www.newsday.com/news/new-york/nyc-terror-suspect-
timeline-1.14716803 (reporting how a vast sensor net in Manhattan helped local 
police investigate a terror attack and noting that “the ubiquitous array of sensors 
and photographic scanners posted throughout the city . . . [gave] cops near-instant 
access to the movements of any vehicle”). 
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sensors exceed human levels.145 Thermal imagers can detect heat,146 
sometimes even through solid objects.147 Zoom lenses can provide 
fine details at distance.148 Digital, near-infrared imaging allows 
machine vision to see beyond the human visual spectrum.149 
“Sniffers” of various types can detect chemical traces of explosives 
or narcotics.150 Auditory microphones can pick up high octave and 
low octave sounds or extend the auditory detection range beyond 
what a normal human can hear.151 
                                                
 145 See SINGER, supra note 5, at 63 (writing that UAS and manned aircraft are 
different because the UAS “has EO/IR/SARS [electro-optical, infrared, and 
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 146 See Nicholas Filipas, Stockton Police Get Set to Have Eyes in the Sky, 
RECORDNET.COM (Nov. 15, 2017, 7:31 PM), http://www.recordnet.com/news/ 
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police department in Stockton, CA will be fielding a remotely piloted drone 
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 147 See Trevor Pott, Peekaboo Drones and Edge Computing, VIRTUALIZATION 
& CLOUD REV. (Nov. 1, 2017), https://virtualizationreview.com/articles 
/2017/11/01/peekaboo-drones-and-edge-computing.aspx (reporting on a 
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moving humans behind walls). 
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With Limits, KTOO PUB. MEDIA (Nov. 17, 2017), https://www.ktoo.org/ 
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proposed law enforcement drone’s “[o]verhead cameras can reduce search times 
for missing [people and for] [d]ocumenting a crime scene” but also that there may 
be “tactical applications when . . . responding with a SWAT team”). 
 149 See Lindsay Grant, Near-Infrared Imaging Enables Machine-Vision 
Advances, SENSORS ONLINE (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:00 AM), 
https://www.sensorsmag.com/components/near-infrared-imaging-enables-
machine-vision-advances. 
 150 Compare Stacy Liberatore, The Drug and Bomb Sniffing Drone that can 
Detect Dangerous Chemicals from 1.8 Miles Away, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 15, 2016, 
7:06 PM), http://www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-3940206/The-drug-
bomb-sniffing-drone-detect-dangerous-chemicals-1-8-MILES-away.html 
(describing a laser-based “sniffing” system), with Sarah Goncalves, Drone of the 
Week: ‘Bomb-Sniffing’ UAVs Can Detect Nuclear Weapons, ECN (May 10, 2016, 
3:35 PM), https://www.ecnmag.com/blog/2016/05/drone-week-bomb-sniffing-
uavs-can-detect-nuclear-weapons (describing a system that relies on neutron-
based nitrogen activation). 
 151 See Ashley Forest & Christy Wilcox, LVMPD Deploys Acoustic Technology 
to Assist with Crime Fighting, KSNV (Nov. 16, 2017), 
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Further, robots tend to be more resistant and resilient to kinetic 
damage than human beings.152 In short, they take a beating better,153 
and, therefore, their use can decrease the risk to actual humans.154 
Again, robots will likely provide increased on-scene time because 
they do not share the human need to eat, rest, and remove waste, nor 
do they get bored, lose focus, or get scared.155 
These increased capabilities manifest in the law enforcement 
context in several key ways. First, regardless of whether we are 
discussing a remotely-operated or autonomous device, having the 
potential for fielding increased full-spectrum sensory capabilities 
allows law enforcement to be more effective at working crime 
scenes, gathering and preserving evidence,156 and establishing a 
better awareness of the environment at both the tactical and 
operational levels. Second, tactically, police units already make 
great use of robots in high-risk situations involving explosives and 
                                                
http://news3lv.com/news/local/lvmpd-clark-county-deploys-acoustic-
technology-to-assist-with-crime-fighting (“ShotsSpotter is an acoustic 
technology that consists of audio sensors that detect, locate, and alert local law 
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 152 See Charles Q. Choi, Damaged Robot Can ‘Heal’ Itself in Less Than 2 
Minutes, LIVE SCIENCE (May 27, 2015, 1:37 PM), https://www.livescience.com/ 
50988-damaged-robot-heals-itself.html; Duncan Graham-Rowe, Robot Spy can 
Survive Battlefield Damage, NEWSCIENTIST (Aug. 20, 2003), 
https://www.newscientist.com/article/dn4075-robot-spy-can-survive-battlefield-
damage/. 
 153 See Daniel H. Wilson, Robots are Tougher Than You, Part 1: The Deep Sea, 
POPULAR MECHANICS (Sept. 30, 2009), http://www.popularmechanics.com/ 
technology/gadgets/a4488/4212397/. 
 154 See Jason Koebler, The Legal and Ethical Ramifications of Letting Police 
Kill Suspects With Robots, VICE (July 9, 2016, 9:30 AM), 
https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/8q8m93/dallas-shooting-bomb-
robot-legal-analysis (asking “[i]f the technology exists to allow police officers to 
do their jobs more safely, why wouldn’t [we] employ the use of robots”). 
 155 See SINGER, supra note 5. 
 156 See Sandra Parrish, Police Drone Aids Accident Investigations, WSB RADIO 
(Aug. 18, 2016, 8:29 PM), http://www.wsbradio.com/news/police-drone-aids-
accident-investigations/ejhL7IpBPJnj4D0Z4PDeRP/. 
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opposed or barricaded entries,157 and--save for the Dallas incident 
described above--have managed to do so without having to resort to 
deadly force. In the event of a terror attack, mass shooting like the 
Dallas event, or the October 1, 2017 tragedy in Las Vegas,158 
employing remotely-operated or autonomous devices will minimize 
the risk to police officers and, perhaps, the public because of the 
absence of physiological or psychological impacts of the responding 
“officer,” improved ability to survey the scene to develop better 
situational awareness, and the likely increased precision in the 
employment of force.159 
                                                
 157 See Iannelli, supra note 8 (noting that the Miami Beach PD drone use policy 
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where there’s ‘imminent danger’”); see also Miami-Dade Police Department 
Draft Drone Standard Operating Procedures, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., 
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Massacre, Police Say, WASH. POST (Oct. 10, 2017), 
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say/?utm_term=.222cfa2d2eee (reporting on the Oct. 1, 2017 mass shooting that 
left 58 dead and hundreds wounded in Las Vegas, NV). 
 159 Compare Conor Friedersdorf, How Two Police Drones Saved a Woman’s 
Life, ATLANTIC (Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/ 
archive/2018/02/police-drones/553406/ (reporting on an event in Virginia where 
the use of two police drones facilitated the non-lethal apprehension of an armed 
subject, who would likely have been shot by police during her apprehension but 
for the use of the drones), with Vivian Wang, Video Shows Daniel Shaver 
Pleading for His Life Before Being Shot by Officer, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/12/09/us/police-shooting-video-arizona.html 
(reporting on a police camera video of officers in Maricopa County that were 
obviously under a great deal of stress when encountering a subject they believed 
as potentially hostile, but ultimately unarmed, then shooting and killing the 
suspect for his failure to strictly abide by police commands to keep his hands 
visible). 
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Finally, the police shootings in Ferguson, Missouri,160 and St. 
Louis, Missouri,161 and questionable police use of force in 
Baltimore, Maryland,162 and Staten Island, New York,163 have 
brought to light concerns regarding the impact of bias, either 
unconscious or intentional, on the part of American police when 
specifically dealing with African-American subjects. This is a 
complex issue that rates its own scholarly writing,164 but it is 
important to note, again, that autonomous police are not human and 
could (and should) be programmed with objective patrol and 
operational criteria that would likely greatly minimize the potential 
for pretext and bias, conscious or otherwise, in police work.165 
                                                
 160 See generally Michael Brown’s Shooting and Its Immediate Aftermath in 
Ferguson, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 25, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/ 
2014/08/12/us/13police-shooting-of-black-teenager-michael-brown.html. 
 161 See generally Tim O’neil & Mitch Smith, Former St. Louis Officer, Jason 
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 162 See generally Rebecca R. Ruiz, Baltimore Officers Will Face No Federal 
Charges in Death of Freddie Gray, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/12/us/freddie-gray-baltimore-police-federal-
charges.html. 
 163 See generally Al Baker & Benjamin Mueller, Records Leak in Eric Garner 
Case Renews Debate on Police Discipline, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 22, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/22/nyregion/nypd-eric-garner-daniel-
pantaleo-disciplinary-records.html. 
 164 See generally Decio Coviello & Nicola Persico, An Economic Analysis of 
Black-White Disparities in the New York Police Department’s Stop-And-Frisk 
Program, 44 J. LEGAL STUD. 315 (2015); Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: 
Instructing Jurors to Consider the Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with 
Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245 (2017); Kimberly Barsamian Kahn, Joel S. Steele, 
Jean M. McMahon & Greg Stewart, How Suspect Race Affects Police Use of 
Force in an Interaction Over Time, 41 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 117 (2017); Clayton 
Mosher & J. Mitchell Pickerill, Methodological Issues in Biased Policing 
Research with Applications to the Washington State Patrol, 35 SEATTLE U. L. 
REV. 769 (2012). 
 165 See ARKIN, GOVERNING LETHAL BEHAVIOR, supra note 17, at 29–36 
(describing lack of emotion as one advantage that machines have over humans in 
lethal decision making). But see CAMPOLO ET AL., supra note 18, at 13–20 
(describing how bias can work its way into computer programs, especially where 
programmers are not diverse); Rosenberg, supra note 15. 
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Furthermore, when operating in a joint patrol tactically—or even 
independently at the operational level—semi-autonomous and fully-
autonomous police robots could provide valuable and ostensibly 
neutral and objective evidence where human police allegedly exceed 
their mandate to protect and serve by violating individual rights or 
inappropriately using force, in much the same way police body 
cameras are intended.166 
B. What is the downside or risk? 
While there are certainly advantages to law enforcement fielding 
drones and robots of varying levels of sophistication and autonomy, 
these advantages may be offset by several inherent shortfalls or 
risks. 
1. Robots, even those operated by people, are not human. 
There is a qualitative aspect to effective police work beyond 
merely responding to crime.167 Most, if not all, police departments 
recognize the value of “community policing” and practice at least 
some form of it, which is heavily centered on police officers placing 
a priority on teaming up and coordinating with the communities they 
serve.168 While generally resource-intensive and recently disfavored 
in New York City’s now-widespread computer generated crime 
statistic-centric strategy,169 community policing is making a 
comeback in the post-9/11 era of “intelligence-driven” police 
work.170 Essentially, police departments have rediscovered the value 
                                                
 166 See Mary D. Fan, Justice Visualized: Courts and the Body Camera 
Revolution, 50 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 897, 947–50 (2017); Mindy Lawrence, Lights, 
Camera, Action: The Age of Body Cameras in Law Enforcement and the Effects 
of Implementing Body Camera Programs in Rural Communities, 91 N.D. L. REV. 
611, 616–18 (2016) (describing the benefits of police use of body cameras). 
 167 See Greene & Taylor, supra note 133. 
 168 See JOHN M. RAY, RETHINKING COMMUNITY POLICING 109 (LFB Scholarly 
Pub. 2014) (“By the mid-1990s, nearly every major police department in the U.S. 
claimed to be practicing some sort of community policing.”); WILLIAMS, supra 
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to find solutions based on the value of the local community.”). 
 169 See RAY, supra note 168, at 139–45. 
 170 Id. at 143–45. 
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of the beat cop working closely within a particular community to 
both leverage that community’s leaders and members in preventing 
crime and helping gain information through these “networks of 
community partnerships.”171 As a result, “[t]he activity of patrol 
remains a central component of modern policing systems and 
(particularly in respect of calls for a more wholehearted return to 
walking beats) is an enduring theme in popular discourses about the 
preferred future direction of policing.”172 
Thus, there was always and remains value in human interaction 
and community policing. It is fair to identify that robots, remotely-
operated, or otherwise, will almost certainly be less capable than 
humans in this regard.173 Furthermore, the temptation to employ 
technology, such as broad sweeping sensors to offset this 
shortcoming, could serve to decrease police effectiveness because 
doing so could reduce the trust between the police and their 
communities critical to the successful implementation of 
community policing.174 
                                                
 171 Id. 
 172 DICTIONARY OF POLICING, supra note 41, at 189. 
 173 See Reid, supra note 7, at 879–81 (noting that robotic police will almost 
certainly have “less people skills and common sense than human officers, and it 
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 174 See Timothy N. Oettmeier & Lee P. Brown, Developing a Neighborhood-
Oriented Policing Style, in COMMUNITY POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 127–
28 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski eds., 1988); Kate Mather & Cindy 
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(Aug. 24, 2017), https://www.policeone.com/police-products/Police-
Drones/articles/413735006-LAPD-gets-an-earful-from-the-public-on-UAV-use/. 
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2. Increased technological capabilities often outstrip existing legal 
checks, especially when used by law enforcement. 
Rapidly-increasing technology always seems to exceed legal 
protections.175 This has been at least as true in the context of 
domestic law enforcement as it has been in nearly every other 
context.176 Over the years, advancements in surveillance 
technologies,177 transportation,178 weapons, and even the 
accumulation and accessibility of data179 have changed how 
domestic law enforcement conducts business. Invariably, law 
enforcement seems to serve as “early adopters” to leverage 
burgeoning technology to gain an edge of the criminals they 
pursue.180 Yet our Courts have sometimes found that the police go 
                                                
 175 E.g., Steven Groves, A Manual Adapting the Law of Armed Conflict to 
Lethal Autonomous Weapons Systems, HERITAGE FOUND. (Apr. 7, 2016), 
http://www.heritage.org/defense/report/manual-adapting-the-law-armed-
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advances often outpace the law.”). 
 176 See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928) (holding that 
warrantless wiretapping violated the Fourth Amendment). But see Smith v. 
Maryland, 434 U.S. 159, 168–69 (1977) (holding that installing and using a pen 
register to record telephone numbers dialed from a phone did not require a 
warrant). 
 177 See generally Kyllo v. Unites States, 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 178 See THOMPSON II, supra note 10, at 7–8; McNeal, Drones and the Future of 
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to Dow Chemical Co. v. United States, 476 U.S. 227, 239 (1986) to Florida v. 
Riley, 488 U.S. 445, 448 (1989)). 
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TIMES (Aug. 15, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/15/nyregion/new-
york-police-civilians-analyze-crime-data.html (reporting that the NYPD is hiring 
employees, optimally with “a combination of law enforcement and math and 
statistics backgrounds, [who] will be expected to find crime patterns before they 
grow too large and to make the department’s vast amounts of crime data easier to 
decipher”). 
 180 Benjamin Mueller & Al Baker, Brooklyn Judge’s Ruling Raises Bar for 
Cover Cellphone Tracking, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 15, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/15/nyregion/brooklyn-judge-stingray-
cellphone-tracking.html?_r=0 (reporting that a New York judge ruled that that the 
40 N.C. J.L. & TECH. [VOL. 20: 1 
too far when they apply technology without first fully considering 
constitutional protections or to circumvent those protections. 
For example, in United States v. Kyllo, the Supreme Court 
examined the issue of whether a federal law enforcement agent 
could use a crude thermal imager, from the street, to determine 
whether a suspect was growing marijuana inside his home, without 
first obtaining a warrant.181 The Court held that the use of such a 
device, even one that merely measured and visually displayed 
temperature differences, to pierce the privacy one is entitled to when 
within the home was not reasonable without first getting a warrant, 
and, as such, was unconstitutional.182 
In United States v. Jones,183 the Supreme Court examined police 
use of a GPS to monitor the movements of a drug suspect, again 
without a warrant. The Court held in favor of Jones using a trespass-
based analysis, but concurring opinions by Justices Alito and 
Sotomayor touched on the non-trespass issue of whether persistent 
surveillance that tracked the movements of a person around the 
clock violates a fundamental right of privacy, and would be as such, 
unreasonable without first pursuing a warrant.184 
The Court did not squarely address the issue of the 
reasonableness of persistent surveillance squarely in Jones but did 
hold that the Government needed a warrant to pursue more than six 
days’ worth of a subject’s cellular telephone cite records in 
Carpenter v. United States.185 
                                                
NYPD’s warrantless use of a cell tower simulator to track the movements of a 
murder suspect via his cell phone was unreasonable). 
 181 See Kyllo, 533 U.S. at 27. 
 182 Mueller & Baker, supra note 180. 
 183 See United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 402, 404–06 (2012). 
 184 See id. at 412-13. 
 185 U.S. v. Carpenter, 585 U.S. 19 (2018); see Will Baude, Carpenter v. United 
States and the Positive Law Model, WASH. POST (Nov. 21, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/11/21/ 
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.1c0291292649; David Kravets, Supreme Court’s New Term: Surveillance, 
Hacking, Sports Betting—And Cake, Too, ARS TECHNICA (Oct. 2, 2017, 6:00 
AM), https://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2017/10/supreme-courts-new-term-
surveillance-hacking-sports-betting-and-cake-too. 
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Finally, a court in New York recently excluded some evidence 
that the NYPD gathered against a murder suspect that they obtained 
by using a cellular tower simulator to track the subject without a 
warrant.186 The device “essentially tricks nearby cellphones by 
acting like a cellphone tower and intercepting a phone’s signal . . . 
[and can] capture texts, calls, emails and other data.”187 “[T]he 
ACLU has found that at least 72 [law enforcement] agencies in 24 
states and Washington D.C . . . . [along with Federal agencies like] 
the FBI, ICE, [and the] IRS . . . use [such simulators].”188 Indeed, 
“the NYPD has said that it used them 1,016 times between 2008 and 
May 2015.”189 
Robotic policing poses similar risks as those described above. 
Courts have yet to provide any directly on-point guidance describing 
the constitutional limits of the use of artificial patrol police, despite 
law enforcement agencies around the country using or preparing to 
use such technology.190 Further, the concerns identified by the Court 
in Kyllo and Jones are particularly poignant here, given the clear 
application of enhanced imagery technology and persistent 
surveillance to robotic policing.191 
Use of force by robotic police brings the same concerns, given 
the reasonableness standard courts employ in analyzing police use 
of force and the context driven, factually specific foundations 
behind that standard.192 Indeed, what is a reasonable application of 
                                                
 186 See People v. Gordon, 58 Misc. 3d 544, 545–49, 68 N.Y.S.3d 306, 307–09 
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2017); Mueller & Baker, supra note 180. 
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 190 See Jenks, supra note 7, at 1421–24; Michaelle Bond, Drones Give Law 
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_give_law_enforcement_a_new_edge__but_raise_concerns.html. 
 191 See generally United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 413–18 (2012) 
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robotic police use of force, where a remotely-operated device will 
present its operator with less sensory input193 and a more 
autonomous device will both perceive its environment differently 
than a human and then decide to act using exclusively quantitative 
analysis?194 
3. Inherent existential personal195 and species risk196 posed by 
autonomous machines/AI and the value of relative certainty of 
action.197 
The threat of a killer robot revolution has been a hallmark of 
popular fiction for many years.198 Indeed, recently the noted 
                                                
 193 See Breshears, supra note 7, at 205–07. 
 194 See Reid, supra note 7, at 880 (“All the machines have done is to self learn 
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technologist Elon Musk brought the issue to the forefront by posting 
to Twitter that he believed advancements in AI posed an existential 
threat to humanity in response199 to a speech by Russian prime 
minister Vladimir Putin, who himself intimated that the first nation 
to master AI marked the next great opportunity to become the ruler 
of the world.200 Soon after, Musk also collaborated with over 100 
technology experts in urging the United Nations to address 
autonomous weapons, noting that “[o]nce developed, they will 
permit armed conflict to be fought at a scale greater than ever, and 
at time[s] scales faster than humans can comprehend.”201 Notably, 
the renowned physicist Stephen Hawking202 and the neuroscientist 
and philosopher Sam Harris also share Musk’s concerns.203 Yet 
many others believe that “we are a long way from having the 
computing power or developing the algorithms needed to achieve 
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full artificial intelligence”204 and would prefer analysis less focused 
on “sci-fi scenarios or doomsday proclamations” and more driven 
by the need to “set up the structures, the understandings, the norms 
. . . [and] even the rules and laws, that will help us navigate” the 
dawn of AI and devices with high levels of, if not true, autonomy.205 
The real crux of the issue is that no one is certain that humans 
will be able to program robots to act in the manner at least as good 
as a human would, given a complex, dynamic, fast moving situation 
such as whether or not to employ perhaps lethal force as a law 
enforcement patrol officer in accordance with the existing 
constitutional legal standards. However, it is worth noting here that 
human-like decision making is a double-edged sword, and some 
writers have staked out the position that robot-like decision making 
could in fact be superior to human decision making because it would 
presumably be free of emotion and bias.206 
Scholars, scientists, and ethicists who focus on robotic war-
fighting have the same concerns with the ability of AI-powered 
autonomous weapons applying the International Humanitarian 
Law(IHL) or Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC) specifically with 
regard to the core principles of distinction and proportionality.207 
Layered throughout this concern is the idea that once robots figure 
out that it is sometimes acceptable to kill humans, there may be no 
accounting for how or when a “learning” AI might choose to do so 
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or whether or when it will choose to stop doing so.208 This is 
troubling, given some of the inherent advantages that a robot would 
have over a human in that they tend to be both more robust and more 
relentless in pursuit of whatever they believe their goal to be.209 
As a starting point, Alan Schuller recommends that we focus on 
building predictability into artificial intelligence that governs war-
fighting weapons systems.210 He explains that “AI [can and should] 
accoun[t] for uncertainty by weighing the probability of certain 
outcomes against the desirability of such outcomes.”211 Further, for 
an autonomous weapon to act correctly, it must act rationally, which 
“depends on both the relative importance of various goals and the 
likelihood that and degree to which they will be achieved.”212 
Ultimately, “[a]n AI is considered to make rational decisions if and 
only if it chooses the action that yields the highest expected utility, 
averaged over all the possible outcomes of the action.”213 Thus, 
“[w]e must [strive to] program the computer to achieve the ‘best 
possible outcome under the circumstances’” and that once we’ve 
achieved that, predictability of action is the threshold for which we 
should assess the legality of autonomous war fighting machines.214 
While Schuller focuses on autonomous weapons systems in the 
context of warfighting, his focus on eliminating uncertainty of 
action directly translates to the application of the AI that would 
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operate a device in U.S. domestic policing, particularly at the 
tactical patrol level. Additionally, I believe that the importance of 
checking uncertainty of action applies more directly when 
discussing robotic police use of force as compared to law 
enforcement surveillance because the consequences are more 
significant. 
If an AI-driven police robot makes a mistake in data collection 
or surveillance no one is likely to die. The same is not true with 
police use of force decisions, which can be as challenging as, if not 
more so than, LOAC decisions because the rules for domestic law 
enforcement use of force, which are based on “reasonableness,” are 
very much dependent on context and are made even more 
challenging because police-use-of-force-decisions are often 
extraordinarily time compressed.215 Furthermore, though the LOAC 
allows for the deployment of lethal force based on a status 
determination,216 reasonable police use of force is nearly always a 
conduct-based decision.217 
The intersection of context-driven decision making and the 
complexity necessary to account for a highly dynamic law 
enforcement operating environment seemingly exacerbates the 
issues. “The dark irony is that the more advanced robots get, the 
more complex they become, and the more potential they have for 
failure . . . [for if there is] even one icon wrong in billions of lines 
of code . . . the whole system can either shut down or act 
unexpectedly.”218 After all “[w]e’ve all had problems with our PCs 
freezing up . . . That’s inconvenient. But it’s much more worrisome 
if it’s a laptop computer [with a firearm].”219 
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 217 See Palmiotto, supra note 81, at 39–40. 
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4. Employing robots in law enforcement invariably increases the 
trend of the militarization of police. 
Public concern over the militarization of police dates as far back 
to civilization’s first use of an organized central police force in 
ancient Rome.220 In the United States, the 3rd Amendment to the 
Constitution represents one of the first efforts by Americans to keep 
soldiers from enforcing domestic law.221 After slipping the yoke of 
Britain, the young United States stepped away from this idea for a 
bit in response to Shays’ Rebellion and passed legislation 
authorizing the President to call forth state militias to respond to 
insurrections.222 This legislation, which has evolved into today’s 
Insurrection Act,223 was rarely used in the first 50 years of the United 
States save for a few post-Shays occasions.224 
The real tension regarding the U.S government employing 
troops to enforce law arose from the ashes of the Civil War, when 
Federal troops deployed to the Reconstruction-era South to enforce 
the Fourteenth Amendment, which extended Constitutional 
protections to the newly freed, former slaves.225 American 
Reconstruction efforts were politically charged for many reasons, 
not the least of which were the South’s reluctance to fully 
enfranchise African Americans with the same rights of their fellow 
citizens.226 In part as a result of this tension, the U.S. Congress 
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passed the posse comitatus act, which to this day establishes as a 
matter of law that the Army (and Air Force) cannot be used to 
enforce domestic law without the express authority of the 
President.227 The Insurrection Act228 scopes this authority, and the 
Department of Defense, as a matter of policy, extends posse 
comitatus to U.S. Navy and Marine Corps forces.229 
Yet, it does not take actual soldiers or sailors enforcing law to 
cause concerns with trying to maintain the idea that police and not 
soldiers should enforce domestic law. “Militarization . . . can be 
defined in its broadest terms as the social process in which society 
organizes itself for the production of violence or the threat 
thereof.”230 
In the century and a half following the Civil War, America’s 
adherence to the primary policy purpose behind the posse comitatus 
act (that is, the distinction between soldiers and police) has largely 
diminished as the years have passed.231 The late 1960s brought 
significant social unrest as America continued its struggle with race 
relations,232 and in the late 1970s and early 1980s the American “war 
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on drugs” got underway.233 Both brought a significant militarization 
of police, as police departments in general—but specifically the 
ones in large metropolitan cities—partnered with the military to 
develop tactics, create specialized weapons and tactics (SWAT) 
units, and fielded increasingly deadly weapons to counter the 
perceived public safety threat posed by the illegal narcotics trade.234 
As the 1980s progressed, this effort redoubled in response to the 
crack epidemic.235 And after the tragic terror attacks of September 
11, 2001, they seemingly redoubled again.236 In 2018, it’s not 
uncommon to see American police on patrol in major American 
cities armed with assault rifles, Kevlar helmets, and full flak 
protection, much like a U.S. soldier on patrol in Afghanistan.237 
While these efforts do not run afoul of posse comitatus, they have 
marked a fundamental shift in police tactics, procedures, and even 
appearance that many argue undermines the legitimacy of the police 
as an institution.238 
                                                
 233 Id. at 327; BALKO, supra note 12, at 141–45, 147–50, 157–58. 
 234 See BALKO, supra note 12, at 132–33; WILLIAMS, supra note 118, at 324–
27. 
 235 See BALKO, supra note 12, at 155–57 (describing the LAPD’s experiments 
with an armored battering ram used to breach “crack houses.”). For a 
demonstration of the LAPD battering ram in action, see DRAGNET (Universal 
Pictures 1987). 
 236 See BALKO, supra note 12, at 242–43 (“Terrorism would also provide new 
excuses for police agencies across the country to build up their arsenals and for 
yet smaller towns to start up yet more SWAT teams. The second half of the decade 
also saw more mission creep for SWAT teams and more pronounced 
militarization even outside of drug policing.”). 
 237 See Nevitt, supra note 12. 
 238 See Carl B. Klockars, The Rhetoric of Community Policing, in COMMUNITY 
POLICING: RHETORIC OR REALITY 244 (Jack R. Greene & Stephen D. Mastrofski 
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The so called “1033 program” is a direct contributor to the 
symbolic impact of police militarization in the United States: 
Faced with a bloated military and what it perceived as a worsening drug 
crisis, the 101st Congress in 1990 enacted [a] National Defense 
Authorization Act. Section 1208 of the NDAA allowed the Secretary of 
Defense to “transfer to Federal and State agencies personal property of 
the Department of Defense, including small arms and ammunition, that 
the Secretary determines is— (A) suitable for use by such agencies in 
counter-drug activities; and (B) excess to the needs of the Department of 
Defense.” It was called the 1208 Program. In 1996, Congress replaced 
Section 1208 with Section 1033.239 
In the intervening years since the implementation of the 1033 
program, police forces of all sizes around the country took huge 
advantage of the 1033 program and purchased military assault and 
sniper rifles and optics, grenade launchers, mine resistant trucks, 
image intensifiers, night vision goggles, and riot gear.240 During the 
life of the program, the Department of Defense transferred a 
staggering $5.4 billion worth of gear to police departments around 
the nation.241 
Recognizing that “militarized gear sometimes gives people a 
feeling like [police] are an occupying force as opposed to part of the 
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reputation of police). See generally BALKO, supra note 12; WILLIAMS, supra note 
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community there to protect them,” President Obama placed limits 
on the program.242 Shortly after arriving in office, President Trump 
repealed those limits.243 
The idea that police are not soldiers (and vice versa) is a 
fundamental lynchpin to a free and democratic society well-
grounded in the Constitution and Federal law.244 While the recent 
trend has strayed away from this idea, the public—and even some 
police departments and government officials—once again recognize 
the threat to our society that over-militarized police pose, if for no 
other reason than the axiomatic dynamic that once government has 
a tool, they’re going to want to use it.245 Thus, the same dynamic will 
hold true with robotic policing given the far above human 
capabilities they bring to law enforcement. The issue is how to best 
strike a balance between the increased capacity and enhanced 
capabilities robotic policing provides, without crossing the 
proverbial Rubicon as Caesar did when he marched his legions into 
Rome to “protect” the people.246 
5. The accountability gap. 
Finally, one of the key concerns with unmanned devices is that 
their use may make accountability for their misuse difficult.247 This 
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is not so much so where a human being is operating the device or is 
responsible for the use of force,248 but it is more applicable the more 
autonomous a device tends to be.249 Thus: 
[presumably] a computer programmer program[s] these robots so that 
they function correctly and supposedly in accordance with the law . . . . 
Should one of these fully autonomous robots go “stupid” as sometimes 
happens with smart weapons, there has to be a liability regime which 
holds the owners of these things responsible . . . . The fundamental issue 
is necessarily that of accountability and competing human interests. 
Those who decide to use fully autonomous robots . . . should . . . remain 
accountable should there be innocent victims from the use of these 
machines, irrespective of the quality of the programming . . . . An 
effective liability regime will go a long way in assuring the correct use 
of these machines and increase the need for their constant human 
supervision.250 
VI.  RECOMMENDATIONS. 
Given these tensions, I propose the following rules to help 
govern what I believe will be the inevitable widespread use of 
robotic police. All of these rules are generally premised on the 
underlying idea that there should be an inverse relationship between 
autonomy and lethality when discussing robotic use of force in the 
context of American law enforcement. 
Rule 1: Comply with current trends in the state of the law 
when conducting surveillance and “search” activities. 
I am choosing to start with a brief analysis on robotic police 
surveillance because surveillance is inextricably intertwined with 
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the potential for police to use force, in that it provides increased 
opportunities for law enforcement to respond to allegations and 
reports of crime. In a string of aviation-surveillance cases, The 
Supreme Court articulated that “the Fourth Amendment simply does 
not require the police traveling in the public airways at [an altitude 
of 400-1000 feet] to obtain a warrant in order to observe what is 
visible to the naked eye.”251 Yet, Justice O’Connor considered the 
relative infrequency of police helicopter patrols as part of her 
concurring opinion in Riley, “suggesting that more frequent low-
altitude flights might impact whether it is reasonable for one to 
expect privacy from aerial observations.”252 
Thus, one can extrapolate what reasonable, warrantless 
autonomous or remotely-piloted police drone surveillance could 
look like by layering in the Kyllo holding, which seems to stand for 
the idea that police may not use technological means not widely 
available to the public to breach the inherent privacy of the home 
without first obtaining a warrant,253 and Jones, specifically the 
concurrence led by Justice Alito, which represents the idea that 
warrantless police surveillance is limited to human standards of 
persistence.254 
Under the first aspect of this extrapolation, airborne police 
surveillance is likely limited to surveillance conducted by the naked 
eye, and even if there is room to expand on that standard, such an 
expansion would not be so great as to allow a device or sensor that 
could breach the sanctity of the home, even one with comparatively 
rudimentary capabilities by today’s standards, as was used in 
Kyllo.255 
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Next, drone operational altitudes are likely limited to those used 
by the public. In Riley it was 400 feet.256 The Ciraolo court set this 
mark at 1,000 feet.257 This is consistent with the FAA and DoJ drone 
guidelines which currently limits police operations of UAS to 400 
feet and below. 
Finally, the Jones court indicates that there are likely temporal 
limits in play. There, Justice Alito in his concurrence “claimed an 
inability to identify with precision the point at which the tracking of 
this vehicle became a search, for the line was surely crossed before 
the 4-week mark.”258 Regardless, for now, “[g]iven that current UAS 
are piloted from the ground, such continuous surveillance seems 
unlikely for the same reasons that it was unlikely that police officers 
would have chosen to physically follow Jones around.”259 However, 
this would only remain true if the current FAA/DOJ guidelines 
requiring that remotely piloted devices be operated within sight of 
their operators remain in place.260 
The next step in police use of UAS or robotic technology will 
likely be remotely piloted devices operating in a location far 
removed from its operator, as a way station on the path to semi-
autonomous devices, which themselves will be a way-station on the 
path to fully autonomous devices. Today, geographically separated, 
remotely piloted devices are largely the current state of the art in 
military UAS operations with a transition towards types with greater 
autonomy.261 As this trend inevitably takes shape in the context of 
domestic law enforcement drone use, police departments should 
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account for the likely temporal limits on how long a domestic law 
enforcement drone or unmanned vehicle may surveille a suspect.262 
Here, despite all of the discussion of seeing things through the 
use of surveillance, it is also worth noting that it is easy to miss the 
proverbial forest through the trees, in that the issue may not be so 
much unmanned surveillance as it is about just persistent 
surveillance and how much easier digital imagery and data storage 
technology has made it for police to broadly surveil their 
jurisdictions.263 For instance: 
[i]n 2014, residents of Compton, California learned that their city had 
been the subject of a 2012 experiment in total video monitoring. . . . The 
LA County Sheriff’s Department contracted with a private surveillance 
company to test an airborne camera that monitored the entire city 24-
hours a day using high resolution video of everything that happened 
inside the 10-square mile municipality. . . . The imagery was archived, 
so that if a crime had been reported during that period, the police could 
back and retrieve the video and zoom in on the location of the crime.264 
By decoupling the on-scene human operator, “operational-
level,” long range/long loiter time, unmanned vehicles with 
Predator-like capabilities265 would make it easier for police 
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departments to engage in this type of persistent, broad range 
airborne surveillance.266 In fact, some are already engaging in using 
manned aircraft.267 It is also noteworthy that the U.S. Air Force 
recently terminated its Predator program in favor of the more 
capable (and more expensive) Reaper,268 and, as such, there is or will 
be soon a relative stockpile of “pre-owned” DoD Predators looking 
for homes, and ripe for 1033 transfer.269 
Therefore, I believe it is foreseeable that after another terror 
event or mass shooting, a domestic law enforcement agency will 
challenge the FAA/DOJ guidelines to push the envelope on drone or 
robotic mass surveillance.270 If they do so, before springing for a 
Predator system or another likely expensive, operational-level UAS 
to conduct surveillance, they may be well served to pay close 
attention to the direction the Court is moving before expending 
scarce fiscal resources developing and fielding such a program. 
Long loiter time, unmanned surveillance with greater-than-
human sensory detection capabilities would clearly be a very useful 
tool in certain high risk/high consequence operations like the 
aforementioned Las Vegas shooting or in an ongoing Mumbai-type 
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terror attack.271 Thus, while it may be reasonable to read in a warrant 
requirement for day-to-day police drone/UAS surveillance 
operations of a persistent nature, especially those with enhanced 
sensory capabilities consistent with the Riley, Kyllo, and Jones line 
of cases, the law should not be so inflexible as to strictly prohibit 
such police drone/UAS operations in true exigency either with or 
without a post-hoc warrant.272 
Rule 2: Prohibit independent “tactical” patrol operations of 
robotic police. Police departments may, however, deploy robotic 
units independently for discrete purposes, such as crime scene 
analysis, under the on-scene supervision by a human. 
Otherwise, robotic police should only deploy with human 
“partners” on tactical patrol. 
This proposed rule maintains the momentum towards 
community policing, which relies heavily on human-to-human 
interaction, establishing and leveraging relationships, and building 
trust between police officers and the communities they serve.273 As 
I discussed above, robots, remotely-operated or otherwise, are not 
human, and it thus stands to reason that community members may 
have difficulty establishing the trust and relationships with them 
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necessary for successful community policing.274 This is important 
because community policing may in fact be more effective than 
traditional police tactics and serves as a kind of check against the 
trend of police militarization.275 
Further, teaming humans with robots aligns with what many 
believe is the next step in the military’s use of more autonomous 
systems.276 This strategy results in a kind of synergy of operation in 
that it allows “[t]he robot . . . [to] do what robots do best . . . [and] 
[p]eople [to] do what people do best.”277 Of course, effective 
deployment of human/robot teams presumes further development in 
two critical areas—communication between the human and its robot 
partner and trust,278 which Schuller argues is grounded in 
predictability of action.279 
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Finally, with specific regard to law enforcement’s use of robotic 
unmanned aircraft, this rule also has the benefit of remaining 
consistent with the current DOJ/FAA MOU which requires UAS be 
operated within sight of their operator.280 Granted, I do not believe 
that this guidance will continue in force as drone, robotic, and AI 
technology continues to develop and proliferate, specifically from 
the military to the police281 and perhaps even ultimately to the 
public.282 The advantages provided by robotic policing are just too 
great to be limited to remotely-operated, line-of-sight operations. 
But, for now, compliance with the DOJ/FAA MOU cuts towards 
establishing this rule as a sort of check against the current state of 
technology which has yet to reach the level of maturity and 
predictability that Schuller argues is necessary to assuage concerns 
of misuse. 
Rule 3: Prohibit the use of force from operational devices 
because doing so helps prevent the further militarization of 
police. 
This rule is intended to prevent police departments from 
launching a war-on-terror-type drone strike using a high-flying, 
“operational-type” device like a Predator or Reaper283 that would 
orbit the police jurisdiction ready to employ lethal force on someone 
targeted by law enforcement. 
The scholar Peter Kraska, who has written extensively on the 
militarization of American police,284 has generated a list of tangible 
indices of police militarization.285 They include: 
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(1) A blurring of external and internal security functions leading to a 
targeting of civilian populations, internal “security” threats, and a focus 
on aggregate populations as potential internal insurgents[;] 
(2) An avoidance of overt or lethal violence, with a greater emphasis 
placed on information gathering and processing, surveillance work, and 
less-than-lethal technologies[;] 
(3) An ideology and theoretical framework of militarism that stresses 
that effective problem solving requires state force, technology 
armament, intelligence gathering, aggressive suppression efforts, and 
other assorted activities commensurate with modern military thinking 
and operations[;] 
(4) Criminal justice practices guided by the ideological framework of 
militarism, such as the use of special operations paramilitary teams in 
policing and corrections, policing activities that emphasize military 
tactics such as drug, gun, and gang suppression, and punishment models 
based on military boot camp[;] 
(5) The purchasing, loaning, donation, and use of actual material 
products that can be characterized as militaristic, including a range of 
military armaments, transportation devices, surveillance equipment, and 
military style garb[;] 
(6) A rapidly developing collaboration, at the highest level of the 
government and corporate worlds, between the defense and industry and 
the crime control industry[;] 
(7) The use of military language within political and popular culture, to 
characterize the social problems of drugs, crime, and social disorder.286 
Police use of drones and unmanned devices in general, and at 
the operational level specifically, implicates Kraska’s indicia 
numbers (1)-(3), (5), and (6).287 There are clear public safety and 
security benefits to using robotic police devices and there may come 
a day when operational-level drones or robots, remotely piloted or 
otherwise, orbit American cities. Yet in order to balance the benefits 
of robotic policing against the ills that robotic policing represents in 
terms of what would clearly be the further militarization of the 
American police, I propose a strict ban on any use of force from 
“operational”-level UAS, as per se unreasonable.288 Drones working 
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in coordination with police on patrol, optimally in teams, to improve 
the capabilities of human police so that they can better do their job 
is one thing.289 High-flying, “Big-Brother-like” persistent 
surveillance devices coupled to the capability to engage suspects 
with force, either autonomously or without even really having a 
human present on scene, is quite another.290 
This is not to say though, that tactical-level police employments 
of remotely-operated or autonomous use of force do not come with 
similar risks. For example, “Switchblade [is] a microdrone with a 
lethal payload that has been used in Afghanistan since 2012.”291 
At about 24 in. in length, and weighing between 5 and 6 lbs., and with a 
price tag between $40,000 and $150,000, the Switchblade—variously 
referred to by its admirers as the kamikaze drone and the ultimate 
assassin bug—can be transported in the trunk of a car and assembled and 
deployed in a matter of minutes by a . . . police officer chasing a 
suspect—whom it can not only find but kill [with an explosive 
charge].292 
Switchblade can either be piloted or can fly autonomously.293 
Again, there are great benefits to fielding tactical drones in U.S. 
domestic law enforcement, including capability benefits that 
departments and agencies all around the nation are currently reaping 
and capacity benefits that with increased levels of autonomy they 
may soon also do so. But there are individual and societal risks to 
their use, especially if domestic law enforcement agencies follow 
the drone use evolutionary progression of the military and begin 
arming their drones.294 Thus, I also propose the below rules on 
tactical police use of force to help address clear civil rights and 
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Constitutional concerns with the potential of police officers using 
“kamikaze drones.”295 
Rule 4: Checks on lethality and autonomy by mitigating 
against uncertainty of action.296 
This rule is broken into three parts and is intended to establish 
an inverse relationship between autonomy and lethality as a means 
of mitigating the risks inherent in equipping increasingly capable 
autonomous devices with the ability to employ deadly force. 
A. Remotely-piloted and semi-autonomous devices on tactical-
level patrol with a human partner may reasonably apply force, 
up to and including deadly force. 
Again, the legality of U.S. police use of force is based on an 
objective reasonableness standard.297 Thus, it may be reasonable for 
a remotely-operated or semi-autonomous device operating on patrol, 
in conjunction with a human, to employ force, including deadly 
force, in which the human operator makes the decision on the 
employment of force, but we likely will not know for sure until it 
happens. However, as a general proposition, we know that U.S. 
police may use up to and including deadly force when they have 
“probable cause to believe the suspect poses a risk to the safety of 
policy officers or the community.”298 This includes the application 
of force to apprehend a fleeing felon where the officer can articulate 
that the felon posed a serious threat to the public.299 
Michael Palmiotto writes that Graham v. Connor, the last case 
the Supreme Court took up on police use of force, established a loose 
framework in analyzing the reasonableness of that force by seeking 
answers to the following three questions: “1. What is the nature or 
severity of the offense? 2. Did the suspect pose an immediate threat 
to the officer or others? 3. Is the suspect actively resisting or 
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attempting to escape?”300 In analyzing this, courts review the totality 
of the circumstances at the time the officer decided to use force301 
while also accounting for the inherent stress and pressure a human 
officer would encounter in having to make a use-of-force decision.302 
Applying Palmiotto’s Graham factors and assuming sufficient 
sensor and data link technology that optimizes quality of sensory 
data yet minimizes latency303 along with the ability to effectively 
communicate both with the subject and the operator’s partner, then 
it is reasonable to conclude that the police operator of a remotely-
piloted or semi-autonomous device in the near future will likely be 
able to obtain or develop enough information on scene to address all 
of these factors. 
Depending on the circumstances, it may also be necessary for 
the operator to be able to first positively identify the subject to 
satisfy the first or second factors.304 Otherwise, the operator would 
need only to directly observe the subject and, where relevant, use 
the device’s sensors to observe the offense and the environment in 
which the subject and the device are located. Alternatively, it may 
also be sufficient if the operator were able to obtain some of this 
information on scene by communicating with their human partner, 
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dispatch the subject, or other members of the public, as 
appropriate.305 
Courts have granted great deference to police whom are forced 
to “make split second [use of force] judgments—in circumstances 
that are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving,” and police make 
those judgments by using their senses to assess their environment.306 
The ability to rely on senses will, however, differ greatly between a 
device operator and a human on scene.307 For example, the human 
on scene would have access to all five of their senses308 whereas the 
robot operator would likely be limited to sight and hearing. 
Developments in immersive virtual reality may soon change this.309 
Notwithstanding these developments, the robot operator’s ability to 
see and hear will likely be well beyond what their human 
counterparts see and hear, which courts may find as providing a 
sufficient offset for the lack of ability to touch, taste, and feel, when 
trying to assess the reasonableness of a decision to employ force. 
                                                
 305 See generally United States v. Lenoir, 318 F.3d 725, 729 (7th Cir. 2003) 
(“[P]olice observation of an individual, fitting a police dispatch description of a 
person involved in a disturbance, near in time and geographic location to the 
disturbance establishes a reasonable suspicion that the individual is the subject of 
the dispatch.”). 
 306 See Joh, supra note 7, at 536 (quoting Graham, 490 U.S. at 396–97). 
 307 See Breshears, supra note 7, at 204–08. 
 308 Id.; see generally Nicholas St. Fleur, This Exhibition Will Help You Make 
Sense of Your Senses, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 23, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/23/arts/design/our-senses-exhibition-
american-museum-of-natural-history.html (reporting on an exhibition in New 
York City intended to highlight human senses). 
 309 See Noor Farhan, A Glimpse of the Future? South Korea to Pilot Next-gen 
ICT Technology at 2018 Winter Olympics, CHANNEL NEWS ASIA (Nov. 4, 2017, 
10:20 AM), http://www.channelnewsasia.com/news/technology/south-korea-
2018-winter-olympics-pyeongchang-ict-technology-9375108 (reporting that 
South Korea is developing “ultra-high speed 5G wireless data transmission 
system – up to 10 times faster than current 4G networks found in everyday 
smartphones” to facilitate “remote piloting of drones and driverless vehicles of 
the future”); Ben Popper, Drones and Virtual Reality Headsets are a Delicious 
Combination, VERGE (Nov. 24, 2014, 10:28 AM), https://www.theverge.com/ 
2014/11/24/7274997/parrot-bebop-drone-virtual-reality. 
OCT. 2018]Autonomous Platforms in U.S. Law Enforcement 65 
Furthermore, physically removing the robot operator from the 
situation may drive more deliberative, less time compressed 
decision making because the robot operator would not be in 
individual peril.310 This results in a dynamic, though, in which the 
more immersed the operator is in her access to more human-like 
sensory input when controlling the device, the less valuable this 
potential advantage may become. 311 Being physically removed from 
the scene also eliminates individual self-defense as a justification 
for the robot to employ force, but would not impact use of force 
grounded in defense of others against an imminent threat or 
dangerous fleeing felon.312 
In ascertaining reasonableness, a “notoriously opaque and fact-
dependent” assessment, courts could also consider the sufficiency 
of the available sensors and processing latency as compared to the 
state of the art, the quantity and quality of information that the 
device operator relied on at the time she made her decision to 
employ force, the amount of coordination between her and her 
human partner, and to what extent the operator communicated with 
the subject.313 
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B. It will also likely be reasonable to employ tools designed and 
intended to apply less than lethal force, even from autonomous 
tactical device, when operating in conjunction with a human. 
This analysis focuses on the deployment of non-lethal or less 
than lethal tools from a fully autonomous, unmanned device or 
robot.314 For example, “[i]n 2007, iRobot announced a “strategic 
alliance” with Taser International, to develop a Taser-equipped 
version of its popular Packbot[:]” a land-based device used by the 
U.S. military that could be easily converted for domestic law 
enforcement purposes.315 Police departments deploying such tools 
from a remotely-operated device is covered by the analysis 
immediately above. 
Further, this analysis assumes several things. First, it assumes 
the removal of the current FAA/DOJ guidance that essentially 
prohibits the operation of fully autonomous or remotely-piloted 
unmanned devices from being operated outside of the line of sight 
of their operator.316 Again though, this FAA guidance would 
presumably only apply to flying devices and would not reach land 
based robots.317 Second, it assume the development of sufficient 
sensor and artificial intelligence which would allow for on-scene 
decision making capabilities at least equal to that of a human patrol 
officer. 
Scholar Alan Schuller proposed five principles to avoid illegal 
autonomy, in the context of autonomous weapons systems in armed 
conflict. Four of the five translate relatively easily to some extent or 
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another to U.S. domestic law enforcement’s possible future use of 
more autonomous devices.318 
First, Schuller states that “[t]he decision to kill may never be 
functionally delegated to a computer.”319 Here, I propose that more 
autonomous police robots be limited in the tools they are equipped 
with to those that are non-lethal or at least, certainly less than lethal 
than a firearm.320 Courts currently disfavor this tactic as they tend to 
believe that “defining police use of force as lethal or not should not 
be an orienting focus” because “there is no obvious way to quantify 
the risks created by a [police] officer’s specific action.”321 While 
non-lethal weapons can be used to lethal effect,322 distinguishing 
between weapons like firearms that are designed and intended to be 
lethal and those that are not such as Electronic Control Devices (i.e., 
a Taser) and pepper spray should satisfy Schuller’s first principle 
given the discussion of his additional applicable principles below 
and “the fact that the use of a dangerous law enforcement tool is not, 
per se, a use of deadly force.”323 
Second, Schuller notes that “[armed robots] may be lawfully 
controlled through programming alone . . . [despite not being] able 
to perceive, process, and act upon all the factors humans consider 
before employing lethal force.”324 Schuller continues by articulating 
that, through cataloging expected variables, establishing which 
variables we can expect the robot to observe, defining which 
variables are important to a use of force decision, and then finally 
determining how a learning robot may attempt to address those 
variables, it becomes relatively manageable to program the robot’s 
computer processor “to evaluate the probability of certain outcomes 
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as compared to the expected utility of particular actions.”325 In the 
case of a fully autonomous law enforcement device, its operating 
system could relatively easily be programmed with force 
employment parameters that would be driven from its sensor feed 
and could account for the current legal standards326 and factors 
within the operating environment such as whether and to what extent 
the subject is armed, his compliance with orders, the presence of 
third parties, the location of the nearest police or medical support 
unit, and potential risks of further harm to an incapacitated 
subject.327 
Schuller’s third principle is linked to the second, and it is that 
International Humanitarian Law (IHL) or the Law of Armed 
Conflict (LOAC) “does not require temporally proximate human 
interaction with [a robot] prior to lethal kinetic action.”328 Again, 
because this paper addresses strictly non-lethal tools in the context 
of autonomous devices engaged in U.S. domestic police work, 
Schuller’s third principle is not directly applicable, and as such, 
bears no further analysis here. 
Schuller’s fourth principle is perhaps the most important one for 
these purposes because it seemingly stands for the expectation that 
an autonomous armed UAS’ predictability of action will be 
governed by the familiar reasonableness standard. This principle 
“means that the [learning artificial intelligence] system [of an armed 
UAS or robot] may in fact be lawfully unpredictable in certain ways. 
So long as the ways in which the system is unpredictable are 
reasonably unlikely [so as] to render an AWS action unlawful, the 
system [itself] may [still] be lawful.”329 Thus, the existing 
reasonableness standard already employed by courts to determine 
the lawfulness of the use of force should here be flexible enough to 
not require an AI be perfect, provided, that an unpredictable 
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response is reasonably unlikely to result in an unlawful action.330 If 
we apply that standard to the idea of autonomous law enforcement 
devices wielding weapons designed to be less than lethal, then we 
can establish a rule which stands for the idea that it would be 
reasonable, and thus lawful for an autonomous police device to 
employ non-lethal tools as they are intended to be employed, 
provided it does so in a predictable manner. 
Finally, Schuller argues “[l]imitations imposed on an 
[autonomous robot] may compensate for performance shortfalls” as 
his fifth principle.331 This principle is linked to his second and fourth 
principles and it represents the concept that restricting actions that 
an autonomous armed robot otherwise may be capable of can tilt the 
proverbial scale towards reasonableness. For example, 
programming a bias that favors inaction over action unless all use of 
force criteria are strictly met (which is an analysis that humans 
struggle with in the heat of the moment), allowing a robot’s human 
partner to interrupt the robot’s use of force, or limiting the types of 
weapons it carries332 can help account for the potential of 
unpredictable responses and may help drive potentially 
unreasonable uses of force towards objective reasonableness. 
C. Autonomous police robots should not be armed with weapons 
that are designed and intended exclusively for the application 
of deadly force. 
Autonomous police robots should not be armed with firearms, 
and they should not be programmed to use deadly force. From a pure 
risk management standpoint, remotely-operated devices where a 
human makes the use of force decision and autonomous devices 
equipped only with weapons intended to be non- or less-than-lethal 
simply do not pose the same societal or individual risk as 
autonomous law enforcement devices fielding per se lethal 
weapons. Yet this rule may end up as more of a policy determination 
than a legal one because the courts loathe categorizing the means in 
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which police use force as “deadly” or “non-deadly”333 despite 
significant litigation regarding “specific forms of force, such as the 
use of batons, handcuffs, hogties, or pepper spray” and still others 
that address “police dogs, tasers, beanbag projectiles, or carotid 
chokeholds.”334 
Breaking down the factual circumstances in which police may 
employ deadly force and overlaying the Court’s reasonableness 
standard helps this analysis. As I have discussed above, police may 
use force, including deadly force in self-defense and in the defense 
of others, to counter an imminent threat and/or to apprehend a 
dangerous fleeing felon. 
First, much like where we have a remotely-operated device 
where the officer operating the device is far removed from the 
location of the device, there is no individual “self-defense” 
justification when discussing autonomous police robot use of 
force.335 That is the easy part of the analysis. 
The defense of others aspect, however, is more challenging to 
analyze. To start, I also categorize and analyze the “fleeing felon” 
justification in the same manner as the defense of others. I am 
lumping these two justifications together because I believe the 
fleeing felon rule is a form of the “defense of others” justification, 
in that it modifies the imminence requirement to account for the 
“status” of the subject as an actor who has established themselves as 
capable of posing serious danger to society at any time, establishing 
a sort of per se imminence, and has refused to heed a police order to 
stop, thereby justifying the use of force for their apprehension.336 
The real question for these two justifications of police deadly 
force vis-a-vis their application from an autonomous police device 
is whether the societal benefit of allowing autonomous devices to 
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employ deadly force outweighs the risk. 337 This self-styled 
“autonomous police device deadly force deployment test” differs a 
bit from the Tennessee v. Garner balancing test courts have used to 
gauge reasonableness.338 The Garner test purports to weigh “the 
nature and quality of the intrusion on the individual’s Fourth 
Amendment interests [in not being subject to an unreasonable 
seizure] against the importance of the governmental interests alleged 
to justify the intrusion.”339 The Supreme Court later modified the 
Garner test in Scott, by looking specifically to “the use of a 
particular type of force in a particular situation.”340 
My test differs from the Garner/Scott test because the latter may 
end up as too permissive in this context. If we were to apply the 
Garner/Scott test, and assume a level of technological sophistication 
that would allow for sensor and information fusing that drives 
independent, context-based computer decision making not yet here, 
on the horizon,341 we could theoretically arrive at a place where a 
court could find it reasonable that an autonomous device used 
deadly force in response to an immediate threat to others or in the 
apprehension of a fleeing felon, where the device could positively 
identify the subject, the crime was sufficiently serious, and the 
subject did not comply with an order to stop and be arrested. 
Hence, the “autonomous police device deadly force deployment 
test,” which should drive the analysis towards non-deployment until 
the point where A.I. reaches a level of technical maturity and 
societal acceptance342 that would justify its use. To do otherwise, 
even though the law may currently allow for it, results in too much 
individual and societal risk, well beyond that posed by remotely-
operated law enforcement devices or those equipped only with non- 
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or less-than lethal tools.343 The issue of course, is persuading law 
enforcement agencies and their political leadership to acknowledge 
and understand this, which is in part why I recommend relatively 
permissive rules on the use of remotely-operated and non-/less-than-
lethal equipped devices. By establishing these guidelines that 
facilitates some use, we can allow the relevant technology to 
continue to develop in a deliberative, orderly way or make a 
collective societal decision that we are simply not interested in 
walking down the path of “killer” police robots.344  
Rule 5: Strict liability for death or serious bodily injury 
where fully autonomous devices employ force inappropriately. 
Finally, one of the most pressing concerns with robotic and 
autonomous devices is the perception of an accountability vacuum, 
which is brought into keen focus when discussing police use of these 
devices as equipped to employ force. This concern is lessened where 
a human operator makes the use-of-force decision because the 
existing accountability structure would remain in play.345 Things 
become a bit murkier though, if the robot makes the use of force 
decision, even where, as I recommend, we are consciously deciding 
to prohibit autonomous devices wielding weapons designed to apply 
deadly force. 
Again, “[d]eadly force is that force, based on the 
circumstances,” which creates a “substantial risk of death or serious 
bodily injury.”346 Even non-lethal weapons can result in the 
application of deadly force.347 Thus, “[d]epending on the evolution 
of the technology involved . . . [progressing] towards an absolute 
responsibility regime for those who own and operate fully 
autonomous robots” may be the best way to address perceived 
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accountability gaps with U.S. law enforcement agency deployment 
of autonomous devices equipped to use force.348 
I recommend a strict civil liability regime as applied to 
autonomous police use of force.349 This recommendation does not 
address criminal liability, which, even in the case of human officers, 
seldom provides victims relief,350 but instead focuses on the potential 
for near automatic civil remedies where an autonomous law 
enforcement device inappropriately employs force that results in 
death or serious bodily injury. All normal civil procedure rules 
would apply under this proposal so the law enforcement agency 
could theoretically attempt to implead the device’s manufacturer in 
any lawsuit,351 but the immediate onus of responsibility would start 
with the agency fielding the device. This would incentivize police 
departments to take measures to ensure adequate programming of 
these tools and to develop appropriate standard operating 
procedures, tactics, and deployment guidelines while at the same 
time disincentivizing smaller departments from pursing the 
capability, which could, in turn, provide a valuable check against 
further police militarization nationwide. 
VII.  CONCLUSION. 
The ongoing trend of the militarization of America’s police 
forces and the history and existing practice of U.S. domestic law 
enforcement agencies rapidly and quietly fielding technological 
advances in general, and semi-autonomous and remotely piloted 
devices, specifically to execute their mission,352 leads one to draw 
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the conclusion that there will be a “push” for American domestic 
law enforcement agencies to field fully lethal, fully autonomous 
tools sooner rather than later. There are advantages to U.S.-law-
enforcement’s use of semi-autonomous and fully autonomous tools, 
but it is still critically important to establish some minimum baseline 
which adequately accounts for the protection of individual rights 
before this occurs. The rules that I proposed will hopefully help do 
that. The key, however, will be consistent and early adoption. Doing 
so will help us avoid the inevitable problems which will come with 
where we are today and our patchwork of U.S. law enforcement 
“drone” use without seemingly much thought or public discussion 
of how this advanced technology fits within the existing relevant 
applicable legal frameworks. 
 
